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EASTERN

F.O.
371

1947

PALESTINE

FILE No. 2

PP. 650 - 1121

CLOSED
UNTIL
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61747

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

23

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 650
20 JAN
2

Registry Number } E650/2/31.
FROM British Legation
No. Jedda.
Dated 5
Received in Registry } 5-14/6/47.
11 Jan 1947
20 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Refer Jedda Telegram N° 5 (E 205/2/31)
Enclose note from Saudi Arabian Min of Foreign Affairs. wh states that HM Govt have been duly informed of contents of Jedda despatch 388 of Dec 23 and they are consulting States of Arab League what ruling they will accept.

Last Paper.

620.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

W.B. 20/1

61747

(Action completed.)
EM 21/1

(Index.)
4/6/47

Next Paper.

E 697

32003 F.O.P

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References:- FO 371 / 61747

No. 5
54/6/47

E 650
20 JAN

3

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to H.M.Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Legation,

JEDDA

11th January, 1947

Reference to previous correspondence :

Jedda telegram no.5 of 6th January 1947

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy in translation of note no. 12/8/3/736/1771 dated 29th December 1946 from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to H.M.Legation at Jedda.	Representation at Palestine Conference in London - January 1947.

BRITISH LEGATION JEDDA

3479 15099 (4)

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COPY IN TRANSLATION.

4

No.12/8/3/736/1771 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

MECCA

5th Safar 1366,
(29th December 1946).

The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents their compliments to His Majesty's Legation at Jedda, and have the honour to refer to the Legation's note no.385 (436/1224/454) dated December 23rd 1946, regarding the proposal of the British Government that the Palestine Conference should be resumed in London on January 21st 1947, and to inform them that the Government of His Majesty, (i.e. the Saudi Arabian Government), will consult the states of the Arab League , whose decision in this connection will be accepted by the Government of His Majesty.

The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs take this opportunity of renewing to His Majesty's Legation the assurance of their high consideration.

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8

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 697
21 JAN
5

Registry Number } E697/2/31.
FROM Lr. R.C. Hayman
No. Aden.
Dated 17.
Received in Registry } 17 Jan 1947
21 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference (Yemen Delegation)

Refers Aden tel 884 (E146/2/31) discusses 2 Yemeni officials who have applied for facilities to proceed to Jordan as conference rep's, they have no formal letters but passports are endorsed, names are EL SAYID HASSAN AHMAD IBRAHIM, and DR. ADAN TARCICI & arranging air passage by BOAC plane

Last Paper
650 (146)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Cm 22/1


(Action completed.)
8 M 16/1

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E 858

32003 F.O.P



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References:- FO 371 / 61747

INWARD TELEGRAM

This document must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person outside Government Service is authorised.

E 697

Cypher

FROM ADEN (Sir R. Chapman)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 17th January, 1947.
R. 17th " " 12.35 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
No. 17 Secret.

Addressed to H.M. Ambassador, Cairo, No. 2.
Repeated to S. of S.
" " British Middle East Office, Cairo No. 1 (H.M. Ambassador please pass).

My telegram to the Secretary of State No.384 of 30th December, 1946, repeated to you No. 38.

1. Local Yemeni agent has asked me for facilities for two Yemeni officials said to be proceeding to London to the Palestine Conference. They have no formal letters from the Yemen Government, but endorsements on passports substantiate statement above.

2. Names are:-

(1) El Seyid Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim, bearer of Yemeni passport No. 305, which on September 4th, 1946, was endorse with diplomatic visa No.5874 by your Embassy for single journey to U.K.

/(2)

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RECEIVED IN C.B
20 JAN 1947
SENT TO DEP
21 JAN 19

(2) Doctor Adan Tarcici, a Lebanese carrying Yemeni diplomatic passport No. 15 and described (?as omitted) political counsellor.

3. (?I am) arranging air priorities Cairo for both by B.O.A.C. plane leaving Aden on Saturday 18th January and have told them to approach your Embassy for onward facilities.

Copies sent to:-
Foreign Office - Mr. Beeley
Cabinet Offices - Mr. E.A. Armstrong

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

E

PALESTINE

E 858

27 JAN 8

Registry Number: E858/2/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Lt. R. Campbell

No.

Cairo.

Dated

Received in Registry: 232.

25 Jan 1947

27 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

DR. OMAR KHALIL and YUSSEF SAHYOUN due to leave Cairo on B.O.A.C York 2J88 on January 25.

WASSEF KHAYYAL is in Cairo but Embassy have said that they have no authority to allow him with them.

Last Paper.

697

(Minutes.)

Copy to C.O.

H.13. 287/

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

C.O. on E859

Jan. 30

(Action completed.)

20/1

(Index.)

4/6/48

Next Paper.

859

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

Cypher/OTP

E 1858

27 JAN

9

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir R. Campbell. D. 12.42 p.m. 25th January, 1947.
No. 232.
25th January, 1947. R. 12.50 p.m. 25th January, 1947.

3 3 3

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Jerusalem telegram to Secretary of State No. 155.

Sami Taher,

Dr. Omar Khalil and Yussef Sahyoun due to leave Cairo on B.O.A.C. York 2 J88 on January 25th.

Wassef Kamal is in Cairo but we have said that we have no authority to issue him with a visa.

Please inform Conference Department.

[Advance copy sent to Conference Department and Duty Officer Colonial Office].

27 JAN

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Reference:-
FO 371 / 61747

26

24.

E

PALESTINE

E 859

10

Registry Number: E809/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM: Sir R. Campbell.

No. Cairo

Dated 2nd.

Received in Registry: 25 Jan 1924
27 Jan 1924

Palestine Conference.

Refers Palestine Cd 138 (E322/2/31). Informs Khalidi convinced that he left by boat but he does not know the name of the boat.

Last Paper.

858

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8/. G.O. with Cairo 232 on E858
✓ Jan 30

(Minutes.)

Egypt/C.O.

H.J. 28/1

(Action completed.) G.E.M. 30/1

(Index.) 4/6/24

Next Paper.

873

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Reference:- FO 371/10747

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell,
No. 242.

D. 7.15.p.m. January 25th, 1947.
R. 7.59.p.m. January 25th, 1947.

January 25th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

-----oOo-----

E 859

E 322/2/31

IMPORTANT

Jerusalem telegram to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 138.

Khalidi's cousin states that he left by boat from Alexandria four days ago but he does not know the name of the boat.

Further enquiries are being made.

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References:- FO 371/61747

7

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 873

12

Registry Number	E873/2/31.
FROM	Embassy.
No.	Cairo
Dated	66.
Received in Registry	362/10/47 27 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference, Arab Higher Committee

Refers 70. Cf 118 (E12540/8035/31 of 15/1

Transmits copy of letter from Embassy, Cairo & Sec Gen' Ledgue of Arab States, No 362/10/47. dated 21. Jan Paying out that it will be well invited Arab Higher Committee to send rep to Conference, and expressing satisfaction at Committee's acceptance.

Last Paper.

859

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

873.251

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E 885

32003 F.O.P

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/CM
66
(362/10/47).

E 13

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith ~~copies of the under~~ mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

21ST JANUARY, 1947.

E 873
21 JAN

Reference to previous communication:

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM No. 118 DATED 15.1.47. E 1540/807/31.

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, CAIRO, LETTER No. 362/10/47 DATED 21.1.47.	ARAB POLICY: PARTICIPATION OF ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE IN LONDON CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE.

(16864) Wt.35013/683 5,000 1/41 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

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Reference:-
FO
371 / 61727

WAS/CM.
362/10/47.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LATTER'S MEMORANDUM No. 3373/60/1/11 OF DECEMBER 19TH LAST, HAS THE HONOUR, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO POINT OUT THAT HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAVE INVITED THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE OF PALESTINE TO SEND A DELEGATION TO RESUME THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE. I AM DIRECTED TO EXPRESS TO YOU THE SATISFACTION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AT THE COMMITTEE'S ACCEPTANCE OF THIS INVITATION.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AVAILS HIMSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES THE ASSURANCE OF HIS VERY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

21ST JANUARY, 1947.

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8

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 885

27 JAN

15

Registry Number: E885/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM: M. Talbot

No.: Beirut

Dated: 6 January.

Received in Registry: 21 Jan 1947
27 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Transmits account published by Beirut newspaper "Telegraph" of an interview given to its correspondent by Jamal Husseini before his departure for London re Palestine Arab delegation views towards the Conference.

Last Paper.

873

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

M 13. 20/1

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

894

32003 F.O.P.

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References:- FO 371 / 61747

E 16

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

En Clair

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Talbot
No.6. Saving

R. 2.p.m. 26th January 1947.

21st January 1947.

Repeated to Cairo No.5. Saving,
Bagdad No.5. Saving,
Jerusalem No.3. Saving,
Jedda No.5. Saving,
Amman No.2.Saving.

E 885
27 JAN

777

PALESTINE CONFERENCE

The following is translation of account published by the Beirut newspaper "Telegraph" of an interview given to its correspondent by Jamal Husseini before his departure for London via Egypt.

Q. Are the Palestine Arab Delegation going to London to attend the Palestine Conference?

A. We are going to London, but we are not very optismistic. We do not believe that the Palestine problem can be solved on the basis of Britain's present policy, which aims at weakening Palestine, of submitting to Jewish terrorism and of making unjustified concessions. Our only hope in going to London is to be able to explain to the British public the Palestine problem in its true perspective. There may, however, be certain aspects of British higher policy of which we are unaware but which might lead to a modification of Britain's attitude towards Palestine. The invitations to the conference would otherwise be meaningless as the British know well that none of the proposals which they have so far made are acceptable to us.

Q. What is Palestine's attitude towards Greater Syria?

/ A.

JAN 27

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(2)

A. Palestine is preoccupied with its own problem on which it concentrates all its efforts. We shall endorse whatever the Arab League decides. The Arab League has its Charter which we shall observe.

Q. What is the British attitude towards the Mufti of Palestine?

A. Britain's attitude regarding the Mufti remains unchanged. This attitude is strange and indeed without precedent in Britain's policy towards the nationlist leaders with whom she has had to deal. Neither towards Ghandi nor de Valera has Britain shown the personal animosity which she has shown towards the Mufti. There is no place in politics for personal animosity; only interests, principles and deeds justify enmity and hostility. The people of South Africa under their leader General Smuts were engaged in a national movement against British colonial policy. General Smuts is now considered by the British Government as one of their best friends. The personal animosity shown by Britain towards the Mufti has thus given rise to bitter criticism.

Q. How does Palestine regard the Lebanon?

A. I have had talks with the Prime Minister and Minister for for Foreign Affairs whom I thanked in the name of the Arabs of Palestine for the attitude of the Lebanese Government and people towards the national cause. They both assured me that the Lebanon was ready to render any service that Palestine asked. Palestine is the soul of Arabism and its nerve centre in the Middle East. Its well-being involves the well-being of all neighbouring Arab States. Any harm touching Palestine also touches all the Arab States and the Lebanon in particular.

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29

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 894 18

28 JAN

Registry Number E894/2/31.

FROM U.K. Del.

No. Palestine Conference.

Dated

Received in Registry PC (A) (P) 8 Mtg 27 Jan 1947 28 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Transmits notes of the Eighth Meeting of Conference held on 27. Jany. 1947.

Last Paper.

~~E 1253/5704/89~~

References.

(Minutes.)

H23. 29/1

8a. P.P. PC (A)(P) 8th Mtg. "amendment" 31/1

H23. 10/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E. Dept Comps.
Amman
Beirut
Bagdad
B.M.E.O.
Cairo
Jedda
w/Hon.


amendment Jan 31
East. Ditto. Feb.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
31/1	4/6/48

Next Paper.

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32003 F.O.P



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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

E. 894
28 Jan 1947. 19

Copy No. 53

PC(A)(P) 8th Meeting (DRAFT)

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Eighth Meeting held at St. James's Palace, London, S.W.1., on Monday, 27th January, 1947, at 12 noon.

PRESENT:-

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook,
Secretary of the Cabinet

FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Orme Sargent
Sir Robert Howe
Mr C.W. Baxter
Mr I.P. Garran
Mr H. Beeley
Mr J.P.E.C. Henniker Major

COLONIAL OFFICE

Mr. J.M. Martin
Sir Douglas Harris
Mr E.R. Edmonds
Mr. I.D. Robertson

ARAB DELEGATIONS

EGYPT

His Excellency Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha

His Excellency Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey

M. Abdel Moneim Mostafa

M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin

IRAQ

His Excellency Dr Fadhil Jamali

M. Arkhan Abadi

M. Bashaian

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LEBANON

His Excellency Camille Bey Chamoun

M. Victor Khoury

M. Nadim Dimechkie

PALESTINE ARABS

Jamal Effendi Husseini

Dr Hussein Khalidi

Emile Effendi Ghoury

SAUDI-ARABIA

His Excellency Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

SYRIA

His Excellency Faris Bey Khouri

His Excellency Amir Adil Arslan

His Excellency Dr Najib Armenazi

TRANSJORDAN

His Highness Abdul Majid Haidar

Hani Bey Hashim

His Excellency Dr Fawzi Bey Mulki

YEMEN

His Royal Highness Seif-al-Islam Abdullah

El Sayid Hassan Ali Ibrahim

Dr Adnan Tarcici

Mr Burhan Dajani (Interpreter)

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr E.A. Armstrong	Secretary
Mr C.A. Gault Mr W.A.C. Mathieson	Assistant Secretaries
Mr S. Naish	Social Secretary

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MR BEVIN: Gentlemen, I extend to you once again on behalf of His Majesty's Government a welcome to London.

We are now beginning what must be, so far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, a final effort to settle the Palestine problem. Since the close of the 1914-18 war. His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to carry out their undertakings throughout the Arab world and have helped to create, as I think you will acknowledge, a number of independent States. The one exception has been Palestine the most intractable problem of all. In 1917 His Majesty's Government issued the Balfour Declaration with the object of establishing a Jewish National Home. This declaration was brought before the former League of Nations, and was incorporated in the Mandate which Great Britain undertook. Since that time many attempts have been made to find a solution of the Jewish-Arab problem, which has hitherto defied a settlement and now seems more difficult than ever. His Majesty's Government are anxious to make a special endeavour at this meeting of the Palestine Conference and at discussions which are about to take place with the Jews to see whether it is at all possible to find the answer to this riddle. I am sure everyone sitting round the table with me this morning recognises that the peace of the Middle East and also the part that Great Britain is to play in the Middle East depend on the solution of this problem. We are now at the cross roads. During the next few days His Majesty's Government will have to consider what solutions are possible and if none is possible, what His Majesty's Government's next step must be.

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It is no longer a question merely of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. I feel myself that the whole future of the Middle East is at stake and I hope that we shall all approach the problem in a statesmanlike manner without prejudice and with a sense of responsibility, and that we shall do our utmost to find a solution. The present situation cannot be allowed to continue. I do not think Great Britain deserves it. The part she has played in two wars and the price she has paid in blood and money and tears entitles her to the most serious consideration.

As to procedure to-day, I feel that as the Palestinian Arabs were not present at the previous Sessions of the Conference it would not be proper for any statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude to be made until we have heard the Arab case as a whole. I welcome the Palestinian Arab representatives and suggest that the next step should be that we should hear the Palestinian Arabs and any subsequent comments which Delegates may wish to make. We have given very careful attention to the proposals which the Arab Delegates left with us when the Conference last met. I am not in a position to comment upon them to-day but I shall make a statement later. When we have heard the Palestinian Arab representatives His Majesty's Government will then have before it the full case so far as the Arab Delegations are concerned.

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JAMAL EFFENDI HUSSEINI said that he was prepared to make a short statement. He first thanked Mr Bevin for the welcome he had given them; his kind words were calculated to create conditions of understanding in which a final settlement would be possible. He then spoke as follows:-

The Palestine Arab case is simple and self-evident. It is that of a people who desire to remain in undisturbed possession of their country and to safeguard their national existence in freedom. This natural right happily coincides with the high principle of self-determination and a series of promises and pledges that were given to the Arabs by the Government of Great Britain, who occupied Palestine after having declared to the world that they entered the Holy Land as allies and deliverers of its people, and not as conquerors.

During the last 25 years, however, Palestine has been denied the right to self-government, in violation of those rights and pledges as well as the Covenant of the League of Nations. An autocratic administration was set up with the primary aim of assisting the Jews in their invasion of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration, upon which this policy is based, was a vague and one-sided engagement made by Great Britain to alien Jews in the absence and complete ignorance of the Arab owners of the country.

Since 1918 the Jewish elements in Palestine have increased, by enforced immigration, from 7% to 33% of the entire population. Their land holdings grew from 1% to 30% of the cultivable area of Palestine. The Arab majority have correspondingly been adversely affected.

Through the Jewish Agency, Jews in Palestine have enjoyed the privileges of a state within a state, while the

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Arabs have had no say whatever in the government of their country. In every aspect of life Jews have been granted privileges and advantages denied to the Arabs. In matters relating to labour and land they were allowed to adopt a policy of exclusion that has no precedent.

During this period Jewish political claims have inflated from a modest spiritual home to the establishment of a Jewish state, which they seek to enforce by the present campaign of terrorism.

This state of affairs has driven the Arabs to the point of exasperation for they behold that all the apprehensions they entertained 25 years ago are being rapidly justified.

Certain quarters have proposed that justice may be done if the country were partitioned between Arabs and Jews. We believe that such a proposal is an easy pretext for overlooking the fundamental issues of the controversy, and for evading the difficulties of a problem that has been created by a gross injustice. The futility injustice, and impracticability of partition have been proved by a special commission of experts that was sent over to Palestine by the British Government to study the subject on the spot. It is a foregone conclusion that the Arabs of Palestine are determined to reject partition, and resist it with all the means at their disposal. To the Arab world, partition presents a further menace. The Arab world is a territorial continuity inhabited by a homogeneous population with one national outlook. As such it is free from serious frictions and is a natural bulwark for peace. Homogeneity in race has always been the natural basis for mutual understanding and community of interests. The creation of an alien Jewish state in Palestine means the destruction of this territorial continuity and national homogeneity and the creation of a

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61787

running sore that will undoubtedly become a permanent source of trouble in the Middle East. Such a move, which in fact entails the creation of another Balkans in the Middle East, the Arabs can never tolerate.

The Palestine problem can only be solved on the basis of the principles of equity and democracy for the preservation of which the two great World Wars were waged. We have no doubt that the Socialist Government of Great Britain will live up to their ideals of democracy by implementing those principles in the case of Palestine and will honour the promises and pledges given by their country to a friendly people.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI expressed the thanks of the other Arab Delegations for the welcome given to them by Mr Bevin and stated that these Delegations had expected at this meeting to hear the reply of His Majesty's Government to the proposals which the Arab Delegations had put forward at the September Session of the Conference. He had no wish to refer to Partition, which had not been proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation last September. He felt confident that this solution would not be put forward, as the Arabs had already made their case against it quite clear. He drew His Majesty's Government's attention to the engagements entered into in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate and suggested that these undertakings had now been superseded by the Charter of the United Nations to which Great Britain had adhered. A National Home for the Jews was not in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. He hoped to hear His Majesty's Government's final views on the Arab proposals.

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MR. BEVIN said that he was not in a position to express the views of His Majesty's Government at this stage. He would be quite frank and say that representatives of His Majesty's Government would meet the Jews in the course of the next day or two. His Majesty's Government had not had an official statement of the Jewish stand-point although the Jewish claim to partition had been widely publicised. His Majesty's Government would stand condemned in the eyes of the world if they did not give the fullest consideration to every point of view.

There were two major difficulties inherent in the Arab Plan; the first was that it denied further immigration to the Jews, and the second, that it put the Jews in a permanent minority in Palestine.

The plan put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation at the earlier session of the Conference had unfortunately been found unacceptable by the Arabs. It provided for a form of cantonisation with a central government with limited powers. This system had worked well elsewhere, e.g., in Switzerland and he himself did not see that it should not be workable in Palestine.

So far as the United Nations were concerned it was unlikely that they would agree to a solution which meant the expulsion either of Jews or of Arabs from the country. The irreconcilable differences which had developed over the last twenty-five years between the two communities in Palestine was the problem which His Majesty's Government had to solve. A considerable body of opinion in the

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United Kingdom held that it was impossible for the Arabs and the Jews to live in Palestine side by side in peace. The Arab Delegates, however, had thought that this was not impossible provided outside influences were removed.

With regard to the remarks made by H.E. Faris Bey Khouri regarding the transference of the Mandate from the League of Nations to the United Nations, Mr Bevin pointed out that the Mandatory was bound to carry out all the original obligations of the Mandate until such time as changes had been authorised by the United Nations or the Trusteeship Council. It might well be that, if no other solution to the Palestine problem could be found, the United Nations would ultimately have to deal with the situation.

MR BEVIN said that the Arab Delegates had been very patient and he was anxious not to protract the length of the Conference. He would not keep them waiting long for a statement of the views of His Majesty's Government on their proposals but before the statement was made, His Majesty's Government wished to hear what the Jews had to say.

After further discussion, MR BEVIN said that His Majesty's Government would consider the statement made on behalf of the Palestine Arabs and any views expressed at the forthcoming meeting with the Jews. He would do his best to state the views of His Majesty's Government at the next meeting which should not be earlier than the afternoon of Wednesday, 29th January. He suggested that he should make a verbal statement in the first instance and that the Conference should thereafter adjourn to enable the Arab Delegates to consider it.

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Reference:- FO 371/61787

The Arab Delegates expressed agreement with these arrangements and the Conference then adjourned until the afternoon of Wednesday, 29th January.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE S.W.1.

27TH JANUARY, 1947.

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

E894/2/31.

29

CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(P) 8th Meeting COPY NO. 53

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946/47

Notes of Eighth Meeting held at St. James's Palace, S.W.1. on Monday, 27th January, 1947, at 12 Noon.

CORRIGENDUM

Page (ii) "PALESTINE ARABS"

Delete the name "Dr. Hussein Khalidi".

No other amendments to the above minutes having been received, it is requested that the copies of the Draft Minutes in your possession should be regarded as FINAL copies.

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

31ST JANUARY, 1947.

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

30

E

E 900 30.

28 JA

Registry Number: E900/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM: Sir. R Campbell. Cairo

No.

Dated: 25-5

Received in Registry: 27 Jan 1947 28 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference

Refer Aden tel 17 to FO. (E697/2/31) Inquiries have been asked by ABDUL MOHAMMED EL AMRI son of Yemen P.M. for Priority air passage to attend London conference. The states he has been summoned by AMIR SEIF EL ISLAM ABDULLA. He would be accompanied by Lebanese Interpreter-adviser named NAJIB ABU EZZELOIN. Asks urgent instructions re issue of visas.

Last Paper.

897

References.

(Minutes.)

a reply has been sent to Cairo asking them to issue visas and arrange air passages.

CAL.
31/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 207 Jan 28.

(Action completed.) 31/2.

(Index.) 4/6/48

Next Paper.

913

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:- FO 371/61727

CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.Campbell
No. 255

D: 5.55 p.m. 27th January 1947

R: 7.18 p.m. 27th January 1947

27th January 1947

Repeated to: Aden

pppppp

E 900
28 JAN

IMMEDIATE

Reference Aden telegram 17 to Colonial Office.

I have been asked by Qadhi Mohamed El Amri son of Yemen Prime Minister for priority air passage to attend London Conference on Palestine. He states he has been summoned by Amir Seif El Islam Abdulla. Accompanying him would be Lebanese interpreter-adviser named Najib Abu Ezzeldin.

2. Please instruct urgently whether I am to issue visas and arrange priority air passages.

[Copy sent to Conference Department and to M.E.Secretariat].

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Reference:-
FO
371 / 61747

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

Cairo

Tel.
No. 207.
Jan 28th.
Repeat Aden
cypher

Dept. No. 1

Mr Beeley agrees
Room G
Advance
Copy Conference
Dept. & CO
a of reply, if possible
N.B.
Amri Seif
confirms that
he wants Qadhi
here
B.S. Beirut
Jan 28

OUT FILE 24/1/32

Date

Despatched 8.2.32

IMMEDIATE

Your tel. No. 255 [of
Jan 27: journey to London
of Qadhi Mohamed el
Amri]

You should issue
visas and ~~give~~
arrange priority air
passages. Please report
number of flight and
estimated time of
arrival.

VB Jan 28

[illegible]

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Reference:- FO 371 / 16147

OUT FILE

33

Cypher/OTP. DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No.207. January 28th, 1947. D. 8.2 p.m. January 28th, 1947.

Repeated to Aden.

, , , ,

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No.255 [of January 27th: journey to London of Qadhi Mohamed el Amri].

You should issue visas and arrange priority air passages. Please report number of flight and estimated time of arrival.

[Copy sent to M.E. Secretariat].

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61727

31

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 913

28 JAN 1947 34

Registry Number: E 913/2/31.

FROM: Embassy.

No.: Cairo

Dated: 67.

Received in Registry: 362/19/47
22 Jan 1947
28 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference Egyptian Delegation

Transmit Note No 41, from Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs giving list of the Egyptian Delegation to the Palestine Conference.

Last Paper.

900

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

H.J.B. 29/1

Egyptian Dept.

P.J.E. Male 30/1

[redacted] Perhaps MEID might like to see this

P.J.E.M. 30/1

Jm 3/2

H.J.B. 4/2

(Action completed.) 18/2

(Index.) 24/6/48

Next Paper.

917

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

/RY

67 (362/19/47)

E 35

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith cop of the undermentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

22nd January 19 47

E 913
JAN

Reference to previous communication:

Cairo telegram to Foreign Office No. 160 of 18th January, 1947. Copy Dept.

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No. 41 Dated 20th January, 1947.	List of Egyptian Government Delegates to Palestine Conference.

(16864) Wt.35013/683 5,000 1/41 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

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Reference:-
FO 371/61747

/EV

COPY

36

Ministere
Des
Affaires Etrangeres

Le Caire, le 20 Janvier,.1947.

DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES ARABES

No. 41

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

En rèponse à la communication de votre Excellence No. 1324/31/46 en date du 25 dècembre 1946, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Gouvernement Egyptien n'a pas d'objection à la reprise des travaux de la Conférance sur la Palestine le 21 janvier courant. La dèlègation qui reprèsentera le Gouvernement Egyptien à cette Conférence est composèe suit :

Son Excellence Abdel-Fattah Amr Pacha, Ambassadeur d'Egypte à Londres	Prèsident.
Son Excellence Abdel-Rahman Hakki Bey, Ministre d'Egypte en Syrie et au Liban	Vice-Prèsident
M.Abdel-Monem Mostafa, Consul Gènèral d'Egypte à Jèrusalem et à Amman	Membre
M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin, Sous-Directeur des Affaires Arabes au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères	Secrètaire.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma très haute considèration.

(sgd) M. F. Nokrashy.

Son Excellence,
Sir Ronald Ian CAMPBELL,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et
Plènipotentiaire,
de Sa Majestè Britannique.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

32

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 937 37

29 JAN

Registry Number E 937/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM Lieut. R. Campbell.

No. Cairo 259.

Dated

Received in Registry 27 Jan 1947 29 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Refers Palestine tel 138 (E322/2/31). Informs KHALIDI sailed Jan 21 from Alexandria on S.S. 'Providence' which was due in Marseilles Jan 26, but is reported to have been delayed at sea owing to bad weather.

Last Paper.

913

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

H.B. 30/1

(Action completed.) 25/1/47

(Index.) 4/6/47

Next Paper.

981

32003 F.O.P.

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References:- FO 371/61747

E 1937
29 JAN

38

E.

Cypher OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir. R. Campbell.
No. 259
27th. January 1947.

D. 12.55. p.m. 28th. January 1947.
R. 7.30. p.m. 28th. January 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

0:0:0:0 322/2/47

Jerusalem telegram number 138 to Secretary of State.
Palestine Arab Delegation.
Khalidi sailed on January 21st. From Alexandria on S.S. Providence which was due in Marseilles [grp.undec: January 26th] but is reported to have been delayed at sea owing to bad weather.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat.]

I.D.

29 JAN 1947

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

33

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 981 39

31 JAN

Registry Number } E981/2/31.

FROM Embassy.

No. Cairo.

Dated 7 5.

Received in Registry } 362/17/47
23 Jan 1947.
31 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Refer Cairo tel 137 (E 558/2/31) Enclosed note from ABDUL RAHMAN AZZAM PASHA N° 38 s of Jan 18 and also Embassy's reply N° 362/17/47 of 23 Jan. Regarding AZZAM PASHA's inability to attend Palestine Conference.

Last Paper.

937

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S/. C.O.
Feb 6

(Minutes.)

DR 6/2
Egyptian Dept.
Copy F.O.

W.3. 1/2

(Action completed.)

EC M 27/2

(Index.)

46 48

Next Paper.

986

32003 F.O.P

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References:- FO 371/61747

RV

No. 75 / (362/17/47)

E 40

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of the undermentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

23rd January 1947

E 981
31 JAN

Reference to previous communication :

Cairo telegram 137 of 16.1.47.

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
To Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha. No. 362/17/47 Date: 23.1.47. From: Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha. No. 385 Date: 18.1.47.	Regarding Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha's inability to attend Palestine Conference in London.

(16864) Wt.35013/683 5,000 1/41 A.&E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61787

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

23rd January, 1947.

41

RC/RV
362/17/47

My dear Pasha,

I was very sorry to learn from your letter of January 16th that your health is unsatisfactory to the extent that you will be unable to leave for London to attend the Palestine Conference there. I have not failed to convey the substance of your letter to Mr. Bevin.

I trust that you will be restored to health before long.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) RONALD CAMPBELL

His Excellency,
Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha,
Secretary-General of
the League of Arab States,
CAIRO.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61787

/RV COPY

42

L'Union Des Etats Arabes

Le Secretariat General - 385 January 18th, 1947.

My Dear Sir Ronald,

I am very sorry indeed but I find myself in the practical impossibility, through my present state of health which is far from satisfactory, of leaving for London to attend the Palestine Conference, in response to the invitation extended to me by His Excellency the Foreign Secretary.

I had the intention to be present at the Conference, and had hoped that my health would sufficiently improve to enable me to do so, which is the reason for not writing to you earlier, but I am still far from being well, and hope that you will be kind enough to convey my regrets to His Excellency the Foreign Secretary.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Abdul Rahman Azzam.

His Excellency,
Sir Ronald Ian Campbell,
H.B. Majesty's Ambassador,
The British Embassy,
Kasr El Doubarah,
Cairo.

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Reference:- FO 371/61727

34

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1986 43

31 JAN

Registry Number } E986/2/31.

FROM C.R.O.D.L. No. Palestine Conference

Dated P.C.(A)(P) 9 and 9

Received in Registry } 30 Jan 1947 / 31 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Transmits notes of the Ninth Meeting of Conference held on Jan 30, 1947.

Last Paper.

981

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E Dept Comps.
Amman
Beirut
Boydad.
B.M.E.O.
Cairo
Jedda.
W.Jon.
FURD
Feb 3 Jan. 31

(Minutes.)

Dion. Are copies of these minutes going to F.O.R.D.? If not, please arrange for them either to have copies or to see the entered pp.

H.Beeley 1/2

Please may I have a copy of these papers to keep. Thanks.

K.C.S.

Folds 4.2.47.

H23. G/2

(Action completed.) 18/2

(Index.) 4/6/48

Next Paper.

E 999

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

44

E. Dept. Complete

Damascus

Feb 12

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

E 1986
31 JAN

45

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 53

PC(A)(P) 9th Meeting (DRAFT)

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Ninth Meeting held at 1 Carlton Gardens, London, S.W.1., on 30th January, 1947, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT:-

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook
Secretary of the Cabinet

FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Robert Howe
Mr W.E. Houston Boswall
Mr C.W. Baxter
Mr H. Beeley
Mr J.P.E.C. Henniker Major

COLONIAL OFFICE

Mr Aidan Crawley, M.P.,
Parliamentary Private
Secretary to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies.
Mr J.M. Martin
Sir Douglas Harris
Mr E.R. Edmonds

ARAB DELEGATIONS

EGYPT

His Excellency Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha

His Excellency Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey

M. Abdel Moneim Mostafa

M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin

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IRAQ

His Excellency Dr Fadhil Jamali

M. Arkhan Abadi

M. Bashaian

LEBANON

His Excellency Camille Bey Chamoun

M. Victor Khoury

M. Nadim Dimechkie

PALESTINE ARABS

Jamal Bey Husseini

Dr Hussein Khalidi

Emile Effendi Ghoury

Sami Effendi Taha

Dr Omar al Khalil

Yusuf Effendi Sahyoun

SAUDI-ARABIA

His Excellency Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

Shaikh Jamil Daud al Musallami

SYRIA

His Excellency Faris Bey Khouri

His Excellency Amir Adil Arslan

His Excellency Dr Najib Armenazi

Mr Raad

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TRANSJORDAN

His Highness Abdul Majid Haidar

Hani Bey Hashim

His Excellency Dr Fawzi Bey Mulki

YEMEN

His Royal Highness Seif-al-Islam Abdullah

El Sayid Hassan Ali Ibrahim

Dr Adnan Tarcici

Mr Burhan Dajani (Interpreter)

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr E.A. Armstrong	Secretary
Mr C.A. Gault Mr W.A.C. Mathieson	Assistant Secretaries
Mr S. Naish	Social Secretary

MR BEVIN explained that he had thought it desirable to change the venue of the Conference to the more intimate setting of 1 Carlton Gardens. He welcomed those members of the Palestine Arab Delegation who had not been present at the last meeting.

Mr Bevin proceeded as follows :-

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At the outset of my statement today I should like to say something about the spirit in which we on behalf of His Majesty's Government are approaching the renewal of our discussions on Palestine. I said on Monday that this was the final round. By that I did not mean that His Majesty's Government have already decided what their policy in Palestine should be. We have not yet taken any final decisions. What I meant was that this was our last chance to explore in conference the possibilities of finding some reasonable settlement of this difficult problem. And I now appeal to you to join with us in trying to find some solution which would be broadly acceptable to all concerned.

This is after all a Conference. If I had come here today simply to communicate to you the final decisions of His Majesty's Government, our discussions could not rank as a Conference in any serious sense of the word. A Conference is an occasion for tabling proposals, examining and criticising them and seeking to reach an agreement. I believe that there is still hope that a reasonable agreement may emerge from further friendly and candid examination of this problem together with representatives of the Arab States and of the Palestine Arabs. As you know, we have also in London at the present time some representatives of the Jewish Agency from Palestine; and with the same purposes in view we are conducting informal conversations with them.

The problem of Palestine's future is difficult

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
in itself and far-reaching in its implications. I shall ask you in a moment to consider some of its international implications. Meanwhile, I want to say a few words about the three types of solution which seem to have attracted the largest measure of support.

The first is that Palestine should attain its independence in the near future as a unitary State with an Arab majority. This is the proposal which you presented to us at the first session of this Conference; and at our meeting on Monday I promised to give you today our considered views on that plan. Your scheme provides for the creation of a democratic State, and it would form an admirable basis for the constitution of a country in which the whole population was in broad agreement on the nature of the State it wished to establish. But any government, if it is to be democratic in practice, must receive a sufficient measure of consent from a sufficient proportion of its subjects. A minority which is sufficiently strong and sufficiently determined to make ordered government difficult or impossible can prevent the democratic functioning of any State. I am bound to say that I think the Jews of Palestine, who now form one-third of the whole population, would refuse to co-operate in working a government of the kind you propose. Co-operation cannot be induced by force. And, frankly, I do not see how your plan could work in practice. Even today, the Palestine Jews give their first loyalty to their own institutions, although they have not reached the point of refusing altogether to co-operate with the British administration. If an attempt were made to substitute for the present form of government an administration of the kind you propose,

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

I am convinced that the Jews would immediately assert their refusal to particupate. On the other hand if a purely Arab administration were then established, the Jews, even if they did not resort to violence, could make i its task virtually impossible by refusing to pay taxes and by other forms of passive resistance. If the Arab Government attempted to coerce them, the result would be civil war. Furthermore, even in the transition period, I do not see how the constitutional process as it is described in your proposals, could be set in motion against Jewish opposition. You provide - rightly in my view - for a Provisional Government containing Jewish Ministers. Frankly, I think that it would not be possible to form any such Government. If we went ahead without the Jews and set up a purely Arab Government we should immediately provoke a rebellion. Then we shoul have to decide either to use British troops to crush it or to come to terms with it and modify our policy.

Partition is another possibility which we have not felt able to leave entirely out of account. Since I spoke to you on Monday we have had some informal conversations with representatives of the Jews. Their initial claim is that the whole of Palestine should become a Jewish State. His Majesty's Government could not support such a solution, and we made this clear to the Jews. They then indicated that they would be prepared to accept the creation of an independent Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine - that is to say, they would be prepared to consider a solution on the basis of Partition. We understand that that is the view of the Jewish Agency. But it is not their view alone. As you know, there are many people in this country and




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Reference:- FO 371/61747


in other countries too, who believe that the only way of securing peace in Palestine is to decide now in favour of Partition.

In considering thi possibility I am bound to take into account what was said at the last meeting by Jamal Bey Husseini. If he were right in believing that the Arabs in Palestine would resist Partition with all the means at their disposal, then Partition would be open to the same objection as your own proposals. It would have to be imposed by force. We have not yet heard the views of the Arab States on Partition. For, as Faris Bey said on Monday, the Delegations of the Arab States have not thought it necessary to comment on proposals which have not been formally presented presented to the Conference. I am not putting forward Partition as a solution recommended by His Majesty's Government. But it has now been put before my Government by the Jews; and, in view of the wide measure of support which it is attracting from many other quarters, I feel that it would be unrealistic to ignore it altogether in our discussions round this table. The position of the British Delegation is that it is willing to examine in full any proposal put forward from any responsible quarter. Partition is, after all, only a word. Those who advocate it seem to have many different frontiers in mind, and it may be that your attitude towards it would depend to some extent on where the frontier is drawn.

I think you will see from what I have said why His Majesty's Government are reluctant to accept the conclusion that there is no way out except by one of these two routes. I cannot say that we have finally rejected



either the proposals of the Arab States or Partition, but we have not given up hope of finding some intermediate solution, which would avoid some at least of the dangers and difficulties to which I have drawn attention in the proposals of the Arab Delegation, without however involving the extreme measure of splitting the country into two separate parts. We should like to make one more effort to see whether agreement can be reached on a form of constitution which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in a single State and to work peaceably together for their common welfare. We do not think this is possible unless both peoples are made to feel secure. Somehow we must get rid of the fear felt by the Arabs that they will one day be dominated by a Jewish majority, and of the fear felt by the Jews that they would not be safe in an independent Palestine if the Arabs were in a permanent majority. Since I am speaking with Arabs now, it is this Jewish fear that I must ask you to take into account. I do not think it can be met unless the Jewish population of the country can be assured of a greater degree of self-government than is provided for in your proposals. There are many ways of attaining this objective. We are not going to ask you to re-consider your refusal to examine the plan of provincial autonomy which we put before you at Lancaster House. I do ask you, however, to join us in examining the possibility of some kind of constitution which would provide for areas in which Arabs and Jews would each exercise a large measure


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of self-government, but which would be held together in some sort of federal unity. We can then see whether it is possible to work out proposals which would give both peoples a sense of security in their own areas, while providing for the growth of the habit of co-operation between them in a central Government.

In the course of our discussions since last October, my colleagues and I have given particular attention to our position with relation to the United Nations. This is a position which we did not consider at the first Session of this Conference, but I suggest that it is important that we should go into it now.

Palestine is not a British possession; it is administered in accordance with a Mandate conferred on Great Britain by the League of Nations. Furthermore, apart altogether from its legal status, it is a country in which all Christian States, in addition to the Moslem States and the Jewish people, are deeply interested. Whatever we round this table may think right, we must face the fact that we alone cannot settle this problem without regard to world opinion. We shall have to secure the acquiescence of the United Nations.

In certain circumstances, indeed, we should be bound to seek the formal approval of the United Nations before giving effect to a change in the constitutional system of Palestine. You will remember that, at the final session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva last spring, a resolution was passed under which mandatory powers are at least morally obliged to obtain the agreement of the United Nations before substituting any new system of government for the existing Mandates. It follows that, if His Majesty's Government were to accept the proposals which were put forward by the Arab

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Delegations at Lancaster House or if, on the other hand, they were to agree to the Partition of Palestine, they would be unable to adopt either course in practice withour first obtaining the formal approval of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a solution of the kind suggested by the British Delegation at the first seesion of this Conference, it would probably not be necessary in law to obtain their formal approval. It is our view, however, that even so it would be expedient to refer our proposals to the United Nations. Whatever policy we may think best, we cannot implement it on our own authority alone: we must seek at least an expression of opinion from the United Nations.

Discussion of Palestine at New York is therefore inevitable. This is an additional complication which I hope we may consider together. If we reach agreement here, we shall also have to agree on the way in which we propose to communicate our agreement to the United Nations. Even if there should be no agreement between us on a policy, His Majesty's Government will have to determine the form in which the problem should be referred to the United Nations.

I hope that no part of what I have said this afternoon will be excluded from our future discussions. I confess that less work has been done on the third intermediate solution which I mentioned today than on either of the other two. Certainly the British Delegation have no cut and dried scheme for an intermediate solution on those lines. We should therefore welcome the opportunity of discussing this in greater detail with you - particularly as it may afford an opportunity for incorporating some features of your own proposals. It would no doubt be inconvenient to discuss these details in so large a gathering as this; and you may be willing to nominate some of your number to join a Committee which would consider this possibility and report back to the Conference.

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
Mr Bevin went on to say that the views he had just communicated to the Conference were the considered views up to date of His Majesty's Government. He had said enough to show that His Majesty's Government were fully aware of the many difficulties inherent in the various possible solutions. They were not prejudiced in one direction or another but they could not completely endorse the opinions of either Jew or Arab on this problem. World opinion now saw two peoples in Palestine and it was felt strongly in many quarters that restitution of some kind should be made to the victims of Hitler's persecution, and that the answer was Palestine. The problems present in Palestine went back for many thousands of years and His Majesty's Government were not responsible for their creation although they were now responsible for a solution. He was thankful that there were only two communities and not more in Palestine. Political and racial difficulties there had become intensified over the past 25 years and His Majesty's Government as mandatory had the task of finding a solution. If no solution could be evolved in the Conference, then His Majesty's Government would have to determine what their future course would be.

There might be other difficulties in the Middle East, but if the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine could only be removed from the international scene, he could see nothing at all which would be likely to disturb the Middle East for many years to come. It

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was one of his dreams to see the Middle East settled and working as a regional unity. He hoped that what he had put before the Conference might contribute to the realisation of this dream.

He admitted that the situation was not one created by the Arabs. The Jews had behaved in a most misguided way and they had been encouraged in their misdemeanours not by the Arabs or by Great Britain but mainly by the United States of America. He could not conceive what had led the Germans to indulge in such extreme persecution of the Jews but the fact remained that the Jews had lost more people during the war than almost any of the belligerents. He appealed to the characteristic generosity of the Arabs to help Great Britain to solve this problem. A satisfactory solution would enhance the reputation of the Arabs in the whole world. The Jews had been foolish to indulge in terrorism but terrorism was not limited to the Jews. Other countries in the past had done extraordinary things to gain independence. He looked forward to seeing a flourishing Palestine. The people of Great Britain could



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could think with pride of how they succeeded in saving Canada, where British and French interests clashed, and in saving South Africa where Boers and British were in conflict. They also hoped to save India and it was surely not beyond them, with confident co-operation from the others concerned, to save Palestine as well.

He would now ask the Arab Delegates to express their views on the points raised in his speech. He would not expect them to commit themselves at this stage but he would be glad to hear anything they had to say completely without prejudice.

H.E. DR JAMALI said he was not prepared to comment in detail on the Foreign Secretary's speech immediately. He hoped that the Arab Delegates would be able to study it together and give a considered reply. But he hoped that the Arabs would not be expected to pay for Hitler's guilt.

MR BEVIN said that the whole world was paying for what Hitler had done.

DR JAMALI said that the Arab peoples were the only ones who seemed to be called upon to pay for what he had done to the Jews.

MR BEVIN said that the difficulties which Hitler had created in Palestine were very minor compared with the widespread difficulties created by him throughout the world.

DR JAMALI said that he thought that Jewish terrorism to some extent offset the debt which the world might be held to owe to the Jews because of Hitler's persecution.

MR BEVIN said that he was a little surprised that there had not been more activities of a terrorist nature

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after the end of the war. Perhaps the Arab representatives did not realise the vast number of people who had been trained by us and the other allies to organise and operate in underground movements to overthrow Hitler. He would not be surprised if Great Britain had, in fact, trained some of the Jewish terrorists. He recalled saying to Mr Churchill, when the latter was Prime Minister, that one of the great troubles after the war would be to induce resistance groups to shake off the habit of opposition to law and order. He was agreeably surprised that the situation in this respect had not been worse. With all the political disturbances which were going on in Europe much more underground armed activity might have been expected. Perhaps such activity was more acute in Palestine than anywhere else but that it should happen was almost to be expected. He did not wish in any way to minimise what had been happening in Palestine; His Majesty's Government were determined to suppress terrorist activities in that country.

H.E. HAKKI BEY said that the Arabs of course desired the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, but it was impossible to reconcile the ambitions of the Jews and the legitimate desires of the Arabs. Public opinion in the United States was one thing, but Moslem world opinion was another thing. Both must be considered. Mr Bevin wished the Arabs to take into consideration the Jews. To which Jews did he refer? To those in Palestine or to all Jews, including those outside Palestine? If he meant all Jews i the world, this would be too much for the Arabs. The Arab

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
Plan, which was submitted in September to the Conference, went a long way to appease the Jews in Palestine. His Majesty's Government must appreciate the efforts already made by the Arabs in meeting the Jews and should consider the possibility of accepting the Arab plan. The Jews were in trouble because they wanted separate terms and refused to collaborate. If they had been willing to work with the Arabs, they would have been much happier.

H.E. Hakki Bey also asked whether Mr Bevin would be able to give any indication of the British Government's views on immigration or whether he would prefer this to be discussed in committee.

MR BEVIN said that immigration, land purchase and economic absorption were critical issues. The Jews wanted to continue immigration and their development of Palestine. He then asked whether the Arabs wished to stop immigration.

Several Arab Delegates replied in the affirmative.

MR BEVIN said that it would not be possible altogether to deny immigration to the Jews. Both sides had rights which were worthy of consideration. Would it not be possible in a bi-national State for an Arab majority to exist in the Arab zone and a Jewish majority in the Jewish zone? The Morrison Plan suggested a possible solution on these lines.



One of the difficulties was that the Government set up under the Mandate of 1922 had no roots in the people. Such a situation could not continue. The purpose of the Mandate had been to develop self-government in Palestine so that both Jews and Arabs could live together and co-operate one with the other. Was it too much to hope that eventually Jews and Arabs would meet in the same room.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that that would be too optimistic.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that before adjourning to study the British proposals in detail, he wished to ask what had been done about disarming the Jews in Palestine. This point had been raised during the first part of the Conference in September. Peace was impossible when people were fully armed. There was no warrant in the Mandate for the arming of the Jews; it was the duty of the mandatory power not to allow the Jews to have weapons. If the Jews had no weapons, there would be little difficulty in developing a constitutional unitary State. His Majesty's Government could not be expected to establish a national government in Palestine while the Jewish community continued to be armed. He was

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sorry to see that Members of Parliament had been saying openly that the Jews should be trained and armed. Surely His Majesty's Government could not agree to that.

Another difficulty was that the Jews resented being in a minority and insisted on becoming a majority. In 1918 the British were acclaimed in Palestine because it was thought that they would bring independence to the country. It was never thought that the Jews in Palestine would be built up and strengthened as had in fact happened.

He asked what were the British views on the Arab proposals and on the Jewish proposals. Had His Majesty's Government any preference?

MR BEVIN replied that his feeling was that a bi-national basis of settlement in which the two schemes would be married seemed possibly the best solution. The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, in his view, had laid a foundation for possible settlement

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but their recommendations had been rejected both by Jews and by Arabs. But he still thought that something on those lines was the only hope.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI then asked whether Mr Bevin thought that the Jews wanted sovereignty of race or sovereignty of religion.


MR BEVIN replied that he thought they wanted both, but that it was a point on which the Colonial Secretary would be better able to speak than himself.

FARIS BEY then enquired how religious sovereignty could be established. The Jews claimed to be a race but he did not think that they were.

MR CREECH JONES referred to Mr Bevin's statement that on a solution of the Palestine problem depended the general peace of the Middle East and perhaps of the world. He felt that a realistic view was necessary. Two communities established in Palestine stood in open conflict. Above them was the British Administration seeking to reconcile their points of view and to establish progressive Government. That Administration rested on an uncertain base and it had no roots in the life of the people. If the Palestine question were submitted to U.N.O. the test of our Administration would be how far it had set up democratic Government in Palestine. In fact, it had derived no inspiration from either the Jews or the Arabs, and that could not continue. No progress in the development of sound, political institutions had been possible and the only result had been the intensification of conflict. To work successfully, the Government must have wholehearted co-operation and he asked whether such co-operation could not be obtained for the mutual benefit of both communities.

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As regards disarmament of the Jews, he agreed that they had many arms but it was impossible completely to suppress the carrying and use of arms without a major military operation. All that could be done had been and was being done by searches and other means, but it was necessary to have the co-operation of the people for the task was not only a military, but also a police operation. Where two peoples were in conflict, as they were in Palestine, the only possibility of peace was the suppression of the conflict by force of arms. The British Government was as anxious about this state of affairs as the Arabs were. His Majesty's Government could not tolerate the indefinite employment of British forces in this way, as would no doubt be made clear in the discussion in Parliament which was to take place next day. The only way, however, to check the carrying and use of arms was the establishment of mutual confidence among all sections of the people, whether Arabs or Jew. Without this, there was no hope. What we wanted the Arabs to consider was not necessarily Partition and not necessarily even their own Plan. The Jews were determined to stay in Palestine and to increase there. If they could not do so by legal means, they would do so by illegal means. This fact must be reconciled with Arab aims and if the Arabs wanted progress it was necessary to surmount these difficulties. The Arabs desired that immigration should be controlled so as to prevent the Arabs being dominated by Jews. Was it not possible to find some way of reconciling the aspirations of both communities.



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H.E. DR JAMALI said that a fundamental aspect of the Arab approach to the problem was that the Arabs had never acknowledged the legality or morality of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The idea that the Jews should be regarded as being the equals of the Arabs in Palestine was unfair and unjust. There was no obligation upon the Arabs to appease the Jews. They had made many concessions in the past but they would not continue to do so at the expense of fundamental justice. The Jews were intruders and their claims should not be met at the expense of the original and legal inhabitants of the country. This would be contrary to all the principles on which the United Nations Organisation was based.

MR BEVIN said that he had put the Arab point of view to the Jews just as he had put the Jewish point of view to the Arabs. But it was quite impossible to revert to the position as it was in 1917.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN asked what provision there would be for Jewish immigration if a bi-national state were set up?

MR BEVIN said that each community would be responsible within its own area for its own immigrants, although there would have to be provision to prevent excessive immigration.

SIR NORMAN BROOK suggested that provision for this might be made in the Constitution.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that peace in Palestine and the Middle East would be impossible so long as the Jews aimed at having a majority in Palestine

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No solution was possible in such a situation. If the Jews abandoned political Zionism and agreed to live side by side with the Arabs in peace, it would be better for them. His Majesty's Government had said that they would not agree to the establishment of a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine, but at recent conferences at Basle and elsewhere the Jews had continued to insist that Palestine must be changed into a Jewish State. The Arabs would never agree to the establishment in the heart of the Arab world of a State which would be hostile to them. Peace would always be disturbed and the Jews would continue to arm and increase their forces so as to realise their ultimate objective. They would never be satisfied with part of Palestine. The Arabs would use all their resources to oppose these ambitions of the Jews. He did not believe that it was possible to remove the fear of the Arabs in this regard.

MR BEVIN said that if a scheme of partition was accepted by the United Nations and frontiers drawn with their approval, surely there would be no real danger that the Jews would seek to extend their frontiers. This would constitute an act of aggression.

Several Arab Delegates expressed doubt as to whether the United Nations could give any effective guarantee to prevent such aggression and cited the frontier disturbances between Greece and her northern neighbours as a case in point.

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MR CREECH JONES suggested that this fear of Jewish expansion was rather exaggerated. The Jewish population of the world had been greatly reduced in recent years and they existed in considerable numbers nowhere outside of the United States. As a people the Jews tended to gravitate towards centres of industry and commerce. Once Europe returned to normal it was probable that large numbers of Jews would be re-absorbed in it. If, in addition, account were to be taken of increased Jewish immigration into the United States and the probable exodus of Jews from Palestine, it was quite conceivable that after two or three years the movement of immigrants towards Palestine would tend to dry up. The pressure of Jews to leave Europe would have relaxed and the desire to build up a large Jewish population in Palestine would disappear. He did not think that it was beyond the political ingenuity of the parties concerned to make provision in a bi-national state whereby all fear of Jewish domination would be removed.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that the Jews looked upon non-Jews as subordinates whom they would use for their own ends and for this they considered they had biblical warrant. The Arabs had no such outlook. The Jews must be persuaded to abandon the idea of a State based on religious and racial principles. Why could they not align themselves on social and political lines as they did in other countries, e.g., the United Kingdom and the United States. If they did so, they might well succeed in winning many Arabs to their point of view on political and social problems, and the obstacles to the two communities living together in peace would disappear.

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MR. BEVIN said that he had told the Jews at the previous day's meeting that if a unitary state were established, their people after a period, would cease to vote as Jews but rather as members of political parties such as Socialists, or Communists. It was significant that the only constituency in the United Kingdom which, on a population basis, was in a position to return a Jewish Member of Parliament had, in fact, returned a Communist.

H.E. DR. JAMALI said that the fears of the Arabs regarding Jewish domination could be understood by the study of modern Zionism. There was no difference between the modern Zionists and the Jewish religious leaders of former times. The intention was the same. Palestine was to be the step ing-stone to something greater. The capacity of the Jews, even when they were in a minority, was enormous. Even the United States was dominated by Jewish influence. The fears of the Arabs had thus a real basis in fact.

MR. BEVIN expressed doubt as to whether the influence of the Jews in the United States was as great as was popularly supposed.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that the Palestinian Arabs rejected the idea of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine. They had social and political reasons for their refusal to agree to any further Jewish immigration. They had represented their case to His Majesty's Government repeatedly during the last twenty-five years, yet the danger of a Jewish majority in the country continued to increase. He suggested that the Conference should adjourn in order to give the Arab Delegations time to consider the proposal put forward by Mr. Bevin for a unitary state.

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H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that the Arabs knew that His Majesty's Government were committed under the Mandate to establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine, but they were under no obligation to set up a Jewish State. Was His Majesty's Government ready to give to the Jews more than they were required to give them under the Balfour Declaration? Did they contemplate taking a new step at the expense of the Arabs? In the Arab view the Jewish National Home was already an accomplished fact.

MR BEVIN acknowledged that the establishment of a Jewish State would be a step beyond the requirements of the Mandate; the point they had to consider was whether it was wise to take this step. He had tried to avoid the necessity of such a solution by finding a middle way by which the two communities could develop together while at the same time the door would not be completely closed to Jewish immigration.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that in the Arab Plan the Arab Delegates had taken account of obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government under the Balfour Declaration to the greatest possible extent. They had agreed to allow the Jews certain privileges which they did not enjoy in any other country in the world. Those were:-

political rights as a community;

the use of Hebrew as an official language in Jewish areas;

and the establishment of Jewish Courts.

If His Majesty's Government were to accept the Arab Plan they should have no difficulty in obtaining international support for it.

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JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that under the White Paper of 1939 His Majesty's Government were under an obligation to stop further Jewish immigration and they should honour that obligation.

In further discussion of the point as to whether it could be said that a Jewish National Home had already been established in Palestine, MR CREECH JONES said that this proposition had never been endorsed by the Mandates Commission, nor by the League of Nations. Nevertheless the problem of Jewish immigration remained and, if a unitary state were to be established, the Government of the state would have to deal with the problem of controlling immigration. The Conference should consider whether some solution would be possible whereby a form of Government was established in Palestine which reflected the aspirations of both communities, including the Jewish desire for continued immigration.

In answer to questions raised by several Arab Delegates regarding American support for the immediate admission into Palestine of 100,000 immigrants, MR BEVIN said that it was the view of United States Government that this number would be within the absorptive capacity of the country, and that they could be introduced without detriment to the Arabs. But the United States Government did not regard this as a final instalment; they contemplated an indefinite continuance of immigration. Our position as Mandatory had been made much more difficult by the pressure put upon us by the United States.

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As a Mandatory the British had a good record. Their administration of the African Mandates was not a matter of which His Majesty's Government need be ashamed. Palestine was the only Mandate which we had been unable to administer satisfactorily. There was a strong feeling in the United Kingdom that if His Majesty's Government could not settle the Palestine problem, it should be handed over to others.

H.E. HAKKI BEY pointed out that the Arab Plan contemplated a stoppage of immigration during the transitional period while the new constitution was being set up. When Palestine became independent it would be for its Government to decide the question of immigration on its merits.

After a short further discussion it was agreed that the Conference should adjourn in order to enable the Arab Delegates to consider the statements made by the United Kingdom Delegates. The Secretariat would make the necessary arrangements when the Arab Delegates were ready for the next meeting.

ST. JAMES'S PALACE, S.W.1.
30TH JANUARY, 1947.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

35

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 999

31 JAN

Registry Number } E999/2/31.

TELEGRAM FROM Lt. R. Campbell

No. Cairo

Dated 283.

Received in Registry } 31 Jan 1947

31 Jan 1947

Palestine Conference.

Refers 70. Cab 20Y (E 900/2/31) Informs Persons named left by York, 4790 on 30 Jan for U.K.

Last Paper.

E 986

References.

(Minutes.)

These two. Qadri Mohamed Abdullah el Amri & Najib Abu Ezzeddin have now arrived here in the Dorchester. They are it seems "advisers". We seemed are speaks fair French English.

C.A.H. 3/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.) E 2/M 12/2

(Index.) R.O. 4/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1038

32003 F.O.P.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

E 999

E. 72

En Clair 31 JAN DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell
No. 283 D. 8.05 a.m. 31st January 1947.

31st January 1947. R. 8.10 a.m. 31st January 1947.

MOST IMMEDIATE RTTTTT

Your telegram No. 207. E 900/2/31

Persons named left by York 4J90 on 30th January for United Kingdom.

[Copies sent Conference Department and M.E. Secretariat].

[Advance copy sent to Resident Clerk].

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Reference:- FO
371 / 61747

36

E

1947

PALESTINE

E 1038

3 FEB

B

Registry Number } E1038/2/31.

FROM C. R. Del.

No. Palestine Conf. P.C.(A)(47) 2.

Dated

Received in Registry } 31 Jan 1947
3 Feb 1947.

Palestine Conference

Change in Venue of Conference owing to difficulties of adequately heating Conference Room at Lancaster Palace. until further notice all Plenary meetings will take place at No 1, Carlton Gardens.

Last Paper.

999

References.

(Minutes.)

14/2.

H.C.

10/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E Dept. Comps.

Amman.
Beirut
Bagdad.
R.M.E.O.
Cairo
Jedda.
N. York. Feb: 3.
P.T.U.

(Action completed.) 24/2

(Index) 4/2/48

Next Paper.

E1048

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

74

74

Ellen Wood
Osmarcus
Feb

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

E 1038
3 FEB

75

CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(47) 2

COPY NO. 53

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946/47

CHANGE IN THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretary

Owing to the difficulties of adequately heating the large Conference Room in St. James's Palace during the present spell of exceptionally cold weather, it has been decided that, until further notice, Plenary Meetings of the Conference will be held in the Foreign Secretary's residence at 1, Carlton Gardens.

The other arrangements connected with the Conference will remain unchanged. The rooms which have been allocated to the Arab Delegations in St. James's Palace are still at their entire disposal.

(Signed) E.A. ARMSTRONG

Secretary of the Conference

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

31ST JANUARY, 1947.

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

37

8 19-7

E

PALESTINE

E 1048 76

3 FEB

Registry Number } E1048/2/31.

FROM

U.K. Del

No. Palestine Conference

Dated P.C.(A)(47) 3.

Received in Registry } 1 Feb 1947
3 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference

Note by Secretariat, Informal number of press photographs taken on occasion of reassembly of Conference have now been received from agencies, Orders for these may be given through Press Officer at Lancaster Palace.

Last Paper.

E 1038

References.

28/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

E. Dept's Comps.
Amman.
Beirut.
Baqdad.
B.M.E.O.
Jedda.
Cairo.
Wtour.

Feb. 3 P.T.O

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

1050

(Minutes.)

HB. 10/2

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:- FO 371/61747

77

[illegible] Dept Comm.
to America
~~Kel~~
March 5

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Reference:- FO 371 / 6147

E 1048
3 FEB

78

CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(47) 3

COPY NO. 56

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

Note by the Secretariat

A considerable number of press photographs taken on the occasion of the reassembly of the Palestine Conference have now been received from agencies and are on view in the Arab Delegates' room (the Armoury) at St. James's Palace.

Orders for copies of these photographs may be given through the Press Officer, Press Room, St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

When ordering, the reference number on the front of the photograph should be quoted.

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

1ST FEBRUARY, 1947.

82

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Reference:- FO
371 / 61747

36

1947

E

PALESTINE

E 1050 79

3 FEB

Registry Number } E 1050/2/31

FROM

No. C.V.

Dated Cyprus.

Received in Registry } 3 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference Yemeni Del

Aden tel 32. of 29 Refers Cairo tel 255 (E 900/2/31) Informs NAJIB ARU IZZEDDIN is obviously our late Political adviser recently invalided from service. Formerly in Yemeni employ and is deeply versed in Yemeni affairs. Suggests discreet informal contact be made with him thinks he would give interesting and reliable information.

(Minutes.)

a copy of the despatch referred to – of Jan 18 – is on its way to us. (E 1461) When that comes we can consider approaching Izzeddin.

C.A. Hamilton
11/2

J.G.
13/2

Dr RP Arden tel 83 A 3

Last Paper.

1048

References.

694/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

P Ellis 12/4

(Index.)

4/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1061

32003 F.O.P

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References:- FO 371 / 61747

INWARD TELEGRAM

F

enter soon

CM 1/2 80

This document must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person outside Government Service is authorised.

Cypher

E 1050

3 FEB

FROM ADEN (Sir R. Champion)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 29th January, 1947.
R. 29th " "

19.35 hrs.

6977/2

No. 32

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated to British Ambassador, Cairo.
No. 4.

900/2/31

Reference British Ambassador Cairo telegram No. 255 to the Foreign Office.

Yemeni delegation to London on Palestine.

2. Najib Abu Izzeddin is obviously our late Assistant Politcial Officer, recently invalided from service (my savingram No. 19 of 11th January refers). He was formerly in Yemeni employ and is deeply versed in Yemeni affairs, especially in connection with Anglo Yemen frontier relations. If you could cause discreet informal contact to be made with him, he would, I think, give interesting and reliable information in connection with Abudllah's approach referred to in my secret despatch of 18th January.

E 1461

Copy sent to:-
Foreign Office - Communications Department.

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

39

E

1947

E 1061 81

3 FEB 1947

Registry Number } E1061/2/31.

FROM

No. Minute

Dated

Received in Registry } 31 Dec 1947

3 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Geiss Cairo report on London Talks i.e. Anglo Arab Talks Jan 27 and 30. Informal meeting between British Del and Jewish Agency Reps on Jan 29.

Last Paper.

10 s-0

References.

(Minutes.)

Hd of P.R. Washington tel 677 of 1/2.

N. American Dept. 2½ Abstract

Copy (with enc.) to C.O.

H.B. 6/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Washington 957

Retd. Cairo 237

Bagdad 83

Beirut 51

Damascus 31

Jedda 32

Amman 28

Ankara 111

Jan 31. PTO

(Action completed.)

28/2

(Index.)

4/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1075

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:- FO 371 / 61747

8/~~Copy~~ 60 (Ref)
(Wilton 677 ~~Tel. 977~~ Acl. 17)

Tel) Wilton 1141.
Repd) Cairo 282
Baqdad 108
Beirut 68
Damascus 48
Jedda 45
Amman 42
B.M.E.O. 182
Feb. 20

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References:- FO 371 / 6174

Registry No.

Top Secret. ~~Secret.~~ ~~Confidential.~~ ~~Restricted.~~ ~~Open.~~

E 1061
FEB

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
January 1947.

Draft. Telegram to: IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET.

Washington.

(H.B.)
Date. Jan 31
No. 157
Cypher.
Departmental No.2.

Repeat to:
Cairo (Embassy) No. 237
Bagdad No. 83
Beirut No. 51
Damascus No. 31
Jedda No. 32
Amman No. 24
B.M.E.O. No. 111

? copy to C.O. for concurrence.
C.O. minute
H.B. 31/1
31/1

Palestine: Interim Report on London talks

Meetings of the resumed Anglo-Arab Conference on Palestine were held on January 27 and 30. An informal meeting between the British Delegation at the Palestine Conference and representatives of the Jewish Agency took place in the Colonial Office on January 29.

2. The Arab Delegates had already presented proposals during the first session of the Conference. The Palestinian Arabs, now attending the meetings for the first time, have not dissented from those proposals. The Jewish representatives at the informal meeting appeared to wish for a return to the status quo ante 1939, that is to say, a resumption of mandatory administration as it existed before the change of policy announced in the White Paper of that year. They would not be drawn into presenting a proposal for Partition although they declared themselves ready to consider ~~proposals~~ scheme for a "viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine," if it was proposed to them.

3. The British Delegation, consisting of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Norman Brook and/

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3148 Wt. 26469/187 100m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

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and myself, explained to both sides some of the difficulties of their own proposals, emphasising in particular the resistance which the Jews would offer to the imposition of the Arab Plan and which the Arabs might be expected to offer to Partition. We were reluctant to accept the conclusion that a settlement must be imposed by force. We therefore wished, while making it clear that His Majesty's Government had not yet decided to reject any proposal which had been put before them, to explore the possibility of an intermediate solution which might meet with a larger measure of acceptance from the people of Palestine as a whole. We suggested that it might be useful to examine the possibility of establishing a bi-national Central Government in Palestine, combined with a large measure of local autonomy for each people. This idea has much in common with the plan for provincial autonomy outlined to the House of Commons last July, but differs from it in providing for the association of Arabs and Jews with the Central Government from the outset.

4. We also emphasised the interest which the United Nations would undoubtedly take in the future of Palestine and the probability that any proposals emerging from the present talks would/

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would have to be referred in some way to the General Assembly.

5. We are now waiting for both Arabs and Jews to inform us that they are ready to comment on the statements we have made to them. I understand that there is depression in both camps.

6. [To Washington only]

Your telegram No. 570, paragraph 3. The American Embassy are being kept informed of developments, and I understand that they are passing their information to the State Department.

[To Cairo only]: please pass to B.M.E.O. as Fo tel No 111

W 31/1

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Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL NO.2

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No.957 D. 8.30 p.m. 31st January, 1947

31st January, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo (Embassy) No.237
Bagdad No.83.
Beirut No.51
Damascus No.31
Jedda No.32.
Amman No.28
British Middle East Office No.111

.....

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

[Palestine: Interim Report on London talks].

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2. The Arab Delegates had already presented proposals during the first session of the Conference. The Palestinian Arabs, now attending the meetings for the first time, have not dissented from those proposals. The Jewish representatives at the informal meeting appeared to wish for a return to the status quo ante 1939, that is to say, a resumption of mandatory administration as it existed before the change of policy announced in the White Paper of that year. They would not be drawn into presenting a proposal for Partition although they declared themselves ready to consider scheme for a "viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine", if it was proposed to them.

3. The British Delegation, consisting of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Norman Brook and myself, explained to both sides some of the difficulties of their own proposals, emphasising in particular the resistance which the Jews would offer to the imposition of the Arab Plan and which the Arabs might be expected to offer to Partition. We were reluctant to accept the conclusion that a settlement must be imposed by force. We therefore wished, while making it clear that His Majesty's Government had not yet decided to reject any proposal which had been put before them, to explore the possibility of an intermediate solution which might meet with a larger measure of acceptance from the people of Palestine as a whole.

We

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We suggested that it might be useful to examine the possibility of establishing a bi-national Central Government in Palestine, combined with a large measure of local autonomy for each people. This idea has much in common with the plan for provincial autonomy outlined to the House of Commons last July, but differs from it in providing for the association of Arabs and Jews with the Central Government from the outset.

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5. We are now waiting for both Arabs and Jews to inform us that they are ready to comment on the statements we have made to them. I understand that there is depression in both camps.

6. [To Washington only].

Your telegram No.570, paragraph 3.

The American Embassy are being kept informed of developments, and I understand that they are passing their information to the State Department.

[To Cairo only]. Please pass to British Middle East Office as Foreign Office telegram No.111.

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E 1061 2 31

E 1061 / 88

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

Cypher/OTP

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE (9*)

Lord Inverchapel.
No. 677.

D. 7.10. p.m. 1st February 1947.

1st February 1947.

R. 12.30. a.m. 2nd February 1947.

INDEXED

.....

SECRET

31/1 — Immediate: Top Secret.

Your telegram 957. Interim Report on

Palestine Talks, paragraphs 5 and 6. London talks.

State Department inform us that the American Embassy in London reports that it has also been in touch with the Zionist representatives and that there is depression in that camp. The Zionists appear to have thought that His Majesty's Government had moved some way in the direction of partition and were accordingly disappointed to find that this seemed not to be the case. The United States Embassy have not been in touch with the Arabs.

FEB 1947

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Registry
No. E

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. Telegram
to:

WASHINGTON.

Cypher

Date Feb: 6.

No. 1141

Departmental No.2

Repeat to:

Cairo 282.

Bagdad 108.

Beirut 68.

Damascus 48.

Jedda 45.

Amman 42.

British Middle East Office. 132.

See end of telegram
H.B.

H.B. 6/2

Advance copies to C.O. and Mr. Twist, D.O.

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3149 Wt. 26469/137 100m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

OUT FILE

89

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

6th February 1947

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET.

D 2·10 pm 6/2/47

My telegram No. 957 [Palestine: Interim Report on London talks]

A further meeting with representatives of the Jewish Agency was held on February 3rd, and another meeting of the Anglo-Arab Conference on February 4th.

2. The Jewish representatives again circled round Partition without however making any positive proposals. They laid great stress on the Jewish demand for sovereignty. The Arab Delegates again maintained that their own proposals offered the most just and practicable solution for the problem. They were prepared to continue the discussions if we could assure them that there was no question of establishing a Jewish State in any part of Palestine and that a limit

had/

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had now been reached to Jewish immigration.

3. The British Delegation undertook to lay proposals before the Arabs after consultation with the Cabinet. They had previously promised to formulate proposals and communicate them to the Jews. Both Arabs and Jews will therefore receive, in the next few days, the outline of a settlement which His Majesty's Government consider to be just and reasonable. I will telegraph to you a summary of these proposals in the form in which they receive Cabinet approval.

[Cairo only] Please pass copy to BMEO as my tel 182.

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OUT FILE

E.

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 1141.
February 6th, 1947.

D. 2.10 p.m. February 6th, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo No. 282
Bagdad No. 108
Beirut No. 68
Damascus No. 48
Jedda No. 45
Amman No. 42
B.M.E.O. No. 132

JJJ

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

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[Cairo only] Please pass copy to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 132.]

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E

PALESTINE

E 1075

4 FEB

92

Registry Number	E1075/2/31
FROM	F.O.
No.	Minute.
Dated	M'Beeley.
Received in Registry	28 Jan 1947 & 7 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference.

Transmit draft for Foreign Secretary's speech at 9th meeting of conference also covering note to S. of S. discussing some of the points of procedure amendments.

Last Paper.

1061

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Down. The role of observer to an international conference is not here. How it has evolved recently.

H.B. 6/2

Please see Foreign Office [illegible]

H.B. 6/2

Put for [illegible] your submit please.

[illegible]

Redraft now enclosed

E Down

H.B. 19/2

In P.P. Draft of M'Beeley's speech 27/1.

H.B. 26/2

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
20/2	4/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1121

32003 F.O.P

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K 93

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Attached is a redraft of the speech which was prepared for you to use at tomorrow's meeting with the Arabs. The department hope that you will open the meeting on these lines for the following reasons.

We have learned that the Arab delegates, after meeting together, have decided that if an attempt is made to draw them into discussion on the basis of partition, they will probably have to break up the Conference and go home.

If any proposals for increased Jewish immigration were put to the Arabs at this early stage in the discussions, they would probably have the same effect.

On the other hand, it seems that the Arab delegates are anxious that the Conference shall not fail and the department think that they could be drawn into discussions on all the points you wish to raise if they were handled with sufficient care at the outset. They are, we understand, prepared to continue discussions after a statement from us that certain aspects of their plan are not acceptable.

As regards the meeting place for the Conference, we are trying, and I think may be successful, to arrange that it should take place at a round table in 1 Carlton Gardens.

29th January 1947.

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Enclosure 94

Mr Bailey

Sir.

29/1.

S/S

Mr Bailey has produced this draft in a rather tentative form tonight so that you will not have it suddenly springing on you at the last moment. He thinks the general line is what you want, though, as he says, there will

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Jl.
28/1.

Lewis to Kerr enclosing

Secretary of State

Palestine

The attached draft for your Speech to the Arabs next Thursday was prepared in consultation with the Colonial Office. It has not yet been seen by the Colonial Secretary or by Sir Norman Brook, who will no doubt wish to suggest amendments.

It will also have to be revised in the light of the instructions which you gave this evening. One way of improving it would be to add a last paragraph, summarizing the argument and pointing out that certain features of the proposals made by the Arab Delegates themselves could be incorporated in the kind of settlement we have in mind.. The Arabs could then be asked to agree that the Conference should set up a committee to discuss the possibility of a settlement on these lines, and also to discuss the ~~special~~ part which the United Nations would probably have to play in the search for a solution.

Such a committee, if the Arab Delegates agree to its formation, would help to keep the Conference in being while the conversations with the Jews are pushed to a conclusion.

H. Beeley.
28th January, 1947.

E 1075
4

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PALESTINE.

DRAFT for Foreign Secretary's Speech at 9th Meeting of the Conference.

At our last meeting I promised to open today's proceedings with a statement of our views on the proposals which you left with us last October, and on our present attitude towards the Palestine problem in general.

You will not expect me to announce at this stage that His Majesty's Government have reached any final decision on their future policy. If I had come here today simply in order to communicate a decision to you, our discussions could not in any serious sense be regarded as a Conference. A Conference is an occasion for the tabling of proposals, their examination and criticism, and an attempt to reach agreement. It is our conviction that there will be great advantage in another friendly and candid examination of this problem in company with the representatives of the Arab States and of the Palestine Arabs.

We are faced with a problem difficult in itself and far-reaching in its implications. Before I conclude these remarks I shall ask you to consider some of the international implications of the present position in Palestine. Meanwhile, I want to say a few words about the three types of solution which appear to be the most widely supported.

The first of these three proposals is that Palestine should be made an independent in the near future as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. This is the proposal which you presented to us at the first session of the present Conference. It provides for the creation of a democratic State, and would form

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an admirable basis for the constitution of a country in which the whole population was in broad agreement on the nature of the State it wished to establish. But any government, if it is to be democratic in practice, must receive a sufficient measure of consent from a sufficient proportion of its subjects. A minority which is sufficently strong and sufficiently determined to make ordered government difficult or impossible can prevent the democratic functioning of any State. I am bound to say that I think the Jews of Palestine, who now form one-third of the whole population, would refuse to co-operate in working a government of the kind you propose. Co-operation cannot be induced by force. And, frankly, I do not see how your plan could work in practice. Even today, the Palestine Jews give their first loyalty to their own institutions, although they have not reached the point of refusing altogether to co-operate with the British administration. If an attempt were made to substitute an administration of the kind you propose for the present form of government, I am convinced that the Jews would immediately assert their refusal to participate. If a purely Arab administration were then established, the Jews, even if they did not resort to violence, could make its task virtually impossible by refusing to pay taxes and by other forms of passive resistance. If the Arab Government attempted to coerce them, the result would be civil war. Furthermore, even in the transition period, I do not see how the constitutional process, as it is described in your proposals, could be set in motion against Jewish opposition. You provide - rightly in my view - for a Provisional Government containing Jewish Ministers. Frankly, I think that it would not be possible to form any such Government. If we went ahead without the Jews and/

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and set up a purely Arab Government, we should immediately provoke a rebellion. Then we should have to decide either to use British troops to crush it or to come to terms with it and modify our policy.

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Partition is another possibility to which we must give serious consideration. As you know, there aremany people in this country, and in other countries too, who believe that the only way of securing peace in Palestine is to decide now in favour of Partition. I think that it would be a great pity if you made it necessary for us to ignore this possibility altogether in our discussions round this table. The British Delegation's position is that it is willing to examine in full any proposal put by any responsible party. Partition is, after all, a vague word. Those who advocate it seem to have many different frontiers in mind and it may be that your attitude to it would depend to some extent on where the frontier is drawn.

On the other hand, I am bound to take into account what was said at the last meeting by Jamal Bey Husseini. If he is right in believing that the Arabs in Palestine would resist Partition with all the means at their disposal, then it would seem that Partition is open to the same objection as your own proposals. It would have to be imposed by force.

I think you will see from what I have said why His Majesty's Government are reluctant to accept the conclusion that there is no way out except by one of these two routes. I cannot say that we have finally rejected either the proposals of the Arab States or Partition, but we have not given up hope of finding some intermediate solution, which would avoid some at least of the dangers and difficulties to which I have drawn attention in the proposals of the Arab Delegation, without however involving the extreme measure of splitting the country into two separate parts. We should like to make one more effort to see whether agreement can be reached

on/

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on a form of constitution which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in a single State and to work peacefully together for their common welfare. We do not think this is possible unless both peoples are made to feel secure. Somehow we must get rid of the fear felt by the Arabs that they will one day be dominated by a Jewish majority, and of the fear felt by the Jews that they would not be safe in an independent Palestine if the Arabs were in a permanent majority. Since I am speaking with Arabs now, it is this Jewish fear that I must ask you to take into account. I do not think it can be met unless the Jewish population of the country can be assured of a greater degree of self-government than is provided for in your proposals. There are many ways of attaining this objective. We are not going to ask you to re-consider your refusal to examine the plan of provincial autonomy which we put before you at Lancaster House. I do ask you, however, to join us in examining the possibility of some kind of constitution which would provide for areas in which Arabs and Jews would each exercise a large measure of self-government, but which would be held together in some sort of federal unity. We can then see whether it is possible to work out proposals which would give both peoples a sense of security in their own areas, while providing for the growth of the habit of co-operation between them in a central Government.

In the course of our discussions since last October, my colleagues and I have given particular attention to our position with relation to the United Nations. This is a point which we did not consider at the first Session

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of this Conference, but I suggest that it is important that we should go into it now.

Palestine is not a British possession; it is administered in accordance with a Mandate conferred on Great Britain by the League of Nations. Furthermore, apart altogether from its legal status, it is a country in which all Christian States, in addition to the Moslem States and the Jewish people, are deeply interested. Whatever we round this table may think right, we must face the fact that we alone cannot settle this problem without regard to world opinion. We shall have to secure the acquiescence of the United Nations.

In certain circumstances, indeed, we should be bound to seek the formal approval of the United Nations before giving effect to a change in the constitutional system of Palestine. You will remember that, at the final session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva last spring, a resolution was passed under which mandatory powers are at least morally obliged to obtain the agreement of the United Nations before substituting any new system of government for the existing Mandates. It follows that, if His Majesty's Government were to accept the proposals which were put forward by the Arab Delegations at Lancaster House or if, on the other hand, they were to agree to the Partition of Palestine, they would be unable to adopt either course in practice without first obtaining the formal approval of theUnited Nations. If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a solution of the kind suggested by the British Delegation at the first session of this Conference, it would probably not be necessary in law to obtain their formal approval. It is our view, however, that even so it would be expedient to refer our proposals to the United Nations. Whatever policy we may think best, we cannot implement

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it on our own authority alone: we must seek at least an expression of opinion from the United Nations.

Discussion of Palestine at New York is therefore inevitable. This is an additional complication which I hope we may consider together. If we reach agreement here, we shall also have to agree on the way in which we propose to communicate our agreement to the United Nations. Even if there should be no agreement between us on a policy, I hope we may still be able to reach an understanding about the form in which the problem should be referred to the United Nations.

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GOR.

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TOP SECRET

PALESTINE

Draft for Foreign Secretary's Speech on 30th January, 1947

At the outset of my statement today I should like to say something about the spirit in which we on behalf of His Majesty's Government are approaching the renewal of our discussions on Palestine. I said on Monday that this was the final round. By that I did not mean that His Majesty's Government have already decided what their policy in Palestine should be. We have not yet taken any final decisions. What I meant was that this was our last chance to explore in conference the possibilities of finding some reasonable settlement of this difficult problem. And I appeal to you to join with us in trying to find some solution which would be broadly acceptable to all concerned.

This is after all a Conference. If I had come here today simply to communicate to you the final decisions of His Majesty's Government, our discussions could not rank as a Conference in any serious sense of the word. A Conference is an occasion for tabling proposals, examining and criticising them and seeking to reach an agreement. I believe that there is still hope that a reasonable agreement may emerge from further friendly and candid examination of this problem together with representatives of the Arab States and of the Palestine Arabs. As you know, we have also in London at the present time some representatives of the Jewish Agency from Palestine; and with the same purposes in view we are conducting informal conversations with them.

The problem of Palestine's future is difficult

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in itself and far-reaching in its implications. I shall ask you in a moment to consider some of its international implications. Meanwhile, I want to say a few words about the three types of solution which seem to have attracted the largest measure of support.

The first is that Palestine should attain its independence in the near future as a unitary State with an Arab majority. This is the proposal which you presented to us at the first session of this Conference; and at our meeting on Monday I promised to give you today our considered views on that plan. Your scheme provides for the creation of a democratic State, and it would form an admirable basis for the constitution of a country in which the whole population was in broad agreement on the nature of the State it wished to establish. But any government, if it is to be democratic in practice, must receive a sufficient measure of consent from a sufficient proportion of its subjects. A minority which is sufficiently strong and sufficiently determined to make ordered government difficult or impossible can prevent the democratic functioning of any State. I am bound to say that I think the Jews of Palestine, who now form one-third of the whole population, would refuse to co-operate in working a government of the kind you propose. Co-operation cannot be induced by force. And, frankly, I do not see how your plan could work in practice. Even today, the Palestine Jews give their first loyalty to their own institutions, although they have not reached the point of refusing altogether to co-operate with the British administration. If an attempt were made to substitute for the present form of government an administration of the kind you propose,

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I am convinced that the Jews would immediately assert their refusal to participate. If a purely Arab administration were then established, the Jews, even if they did not resort to violence, could make its task virtually impossible by refusing to pay taxes and by other forms of passive resistance. If the Arab Government attempted to coerce them, the result would be civil war. Furthermore, even in the transition period, I do not see how the constitutional process, as it is described in your proposals, could be set in motion against Jewish opposition. You provide - rightly in my view - for a Provisional Government containing Jewish Ministers. Frankly, I think that it would not be possible to form any such Government. If we went ahead without the Jews and set up a purely Arab Government, we should immediately provoke a rebellion. Then we should have to decide either to use British troops to crush it or to come to terms with it and modify our policy.

Partition is another possibility which we have not felt able to leave entirely out of account. Since I spoke to you on Monday we have had some informal conversations with representatives of the Jews. Their initial claim is that the whole of Palestine should become a Jewish State. His Majesty's Government could not support such a solution, and we made this clear to the Jews. They then indicated that they would be prepared to accept the creation of a independent Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine - that is to say, they would be prepared to consider a solution on the basis of Partition. We understand that that is the view of the Jewish Agency. But it is not their view alone. As you know, there are many people in this country and

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in other countries too, who believe that the only way of securing peace in Palestine is to decide now in favour of Partition.

In considering this possibility I am bound to take into account what was said at the last meeting by Jamal Bey Husseini. If he were right in believing that the Arabs in Palestine would resist Partition with all the means at their disposal, then Partition would be open to the same objection as ~~our~~ your own proposals. It would have to be imposed by force. We have not yet heard the views of the Arab States on Partition. For, as Faris Bey said on Monday, the Delegations of the Arab States have not thought it necessary to comment on proposals which had not been formally presented to the Conference. I am not putting forward Partition as a solution recommended by His Majesty's Government. But it has now been put before my Government by the Jews; and, in view of the wide measure of support which it is attracting from many other quarters, I feel that it would be unrealistic to ignore it altogether in our discussions round this table. The position of the British Delegation is that it is willing to examine in full any proposal put forward from any responsible quarter. Partition is, after all, only a word. Those who advocate it seem to have many different frontiers in mind, and it may be that your attitude towards it would depend to some extent on where the frontier is drawn.

I think you will see from what I have said why His Majesty's Government are reluctant to accept the

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conclusion that there is no way out except by one of these two routes. I cannot say that we have finally rejected either the proposals of the Arab States or Partition, but we have not given up hope of finding some intermediate solution, which would avoid some at least of the dangers and difficulties to which I have drawn attention in the proposals of the Arab Delegation, without however involving the extreme measure of splitting the country into two separate parts. We should like to make one more effort to see whether agreement can be reached on a form of constitution which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in a single State and to work peacefully together for their common welfare. We do not think this is possible unless both peoples are made to feel secure. Somehow we must get rid of the fear felt by the Arabs that they will one day be dominated by a Jewish majority, and of the fear felt by the Jews that they would not be safe in an independent Palestine if the Arabs were in a permanent majority. Since I am speaking with Arabs now, it is this Jewish fear that I must ask you to take into account. I do not think it can be met unless the Jewish population of the country can be assured of a greater degree of self-government than is provided for in your proposals. There are many ways of attaining this objective. We are not going to ask you to re-consider your refusal to examine the plan of provincial autonomy which we put before you at Lancaster House. I do ask you, however, to join us in examining the possibility of some kind of constitution which would provide for areas in which Arabs and Jews would each exercise a large measure

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G●R.

of self-government, but which would be held together in some sort of federal unity. We can then see whether it is possible to work out proposals which would give both peoples a sense of security in their own areas, while providing for the growth of the habit of co-operation between them in a central Government.

In the course of our discussions since last October, my colleagues and I have given particular attention to our position with relation to the United Nations. This is a point which we did not consider at the first Session of this Conference, but I suggest that it is important that we should go into it now.

Palestine is not a British possession; it is administered in accordance with a Mandate conferred on Great Britain by the League of Nations. Furthermore, apart altogether from its legal status, it is a country in which all Christian States, in addition to the Moslem States and the Jewish people, are deeply interested. Whatever we round this table may think right, we must face the fact that we alone cannot settle this problem without regard to world opinion. We shall have to secure the acquiescence of the United Nations.

In certain circumstances, indeed, we should be bound to seek the formal approval of the United Nations

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before giving effect to a change in the constitutional system of Palestine. You will remember that, at the final session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva last spring, a resolution was passed under which mandatory powers are at least morally obliged to obtain the agreement of the United Nations before substituting any new system of government for the existing Mandates. It follows that, if His Majesty's Government were to accept the proposals which were put forward by the Arab Delegations at Lancaster House or if, on the other hand, they were to agree to the Partition of Palestine, they would be unable to adopt either course in practice without first obtaining the formal approval of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a solution of the kind suggested by the British Delegation at the first session of this Conference, it would probably not be necessary in law to obtain their formal approval. It is our view, however, that even so it would be expedient to refer our proposals to the United Nations. Whatever policy we may think best, we cannot implement it on our own authority alone: we must seek at least an expression of opinion from the United Nations.

Discussion of Palestine at New York is therefore inevitable. This is an additional complication which I hope we may consider together. If we reach agreement here, we shall also have to agree on the way in which we propose to communicate our agreement to the United Nations. Even if there should be no agreement between us on a policy, I hope we may still be able to reach an understanding about the form in which the problem should be referred to the United Nations.

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GOR.

I hope that no part of what I have said this afternoon will be excluded from our future discussions. I confess that less work has been done on the third intermediate solution which I mentioned today than on either of the other two. Certainly the British Delegation have no cut and dried scheme for an intermediate solution on those lines. We should therefore welcome the opportunity of discussing this in greater detail with you - particularly as it may afford an opportunity for incorporating some features of your own proposals. It would no doubt be inconvenient to discuss these details in so large a gathering as this; and I hope that you may be willing to nominate some of your number to join a Committee which would consider this possibility and report back to the Conference.

You may also think it useful that another Committee should be appointed to consider the United Nations aspects of our proposals.

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I understand you may wish to alter this.

Mr. Beeley will be starting by early Monday morning so there should be time to do it then.

JxH 26.1.

I wrote on it on Monday

Mr Beeley.

JH

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G. R.

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P.W. other drafts already entered

PALESTINE

Draft of Foreign Secretary's Speech

at St. James's Palace on 27th January, 1947

I am sorry that the interval since the last meeting of this Conference has been longer than any of us contemplated when we dispersed from Lancaster House. My colleagues and I were very glad to hear that many of our Arab friends who took part in the first session were returning to London for the second. We are sorry that some of them are not able to be present with us on this occasion. I should especially like to welcome, in re-opening the Conference, those who are attending for the first time, and in particular the Delegation representing the Arab people of Palestine. I am sure they will add to the value of our consultations, and I do not think we should proceed far until we have heard a full statement of their point of view.

Since we last met, my colleagues and I have given much thought to the views which were exchanged in Lancaster House and to the Palestine problem in general. I think you should know, before we resume our discussions round this table, that His Majesty's Government have not reached a decision in favour of any specific proposal, nor have they finally rejected any of the various proposals which they have been asked to consider. We have not convened this Conference again, after its unavoidable interruption, in order to present the Arab Delegations with an unalterable decision or even with proposals which we insist on regarding as the basis for negotiation.

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We are faced with a problem difficult in itself and far-reaching in its implications, and it is our conviction that there will be great advantage in another friendly and candid examination of this problem, in company with the representatives of the Arab States and of the Palestine Arabs.

In the course of our discussions since last October, my colleagues and I have given particular attention to our position with relation to the United Nations. This is a point which we did not consider at the first Session of this Conference, but I suggest that it is important that we should go into it now.

Palestine is not a British possession; it is administered in accordance with a Mandate conferred on Great Britain by the League of Nations. Furthermore, apart altogether from its legal status, it is a country in which all Christian States, in addition to the Moslem States and the Jewish people, are deeply interested. Whatever we round this table may think right, we must face the fact that we alone cannot settle this problem without regard to world opinion. We shall have to secure the acquiescence of the United Nations.

In certain circumstances, indeed, we should be bound to seek the formal approval of the United Nations before giving effect to a change in the constitutional system of Palestine. You will remember that, at the final session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva last spring, a resolution was passed under which mandatory powers are at least morally obliged to obtain the agreement of the United Nations before substituting any new system of government for the existing Mandates. It follows that, if His Majesty's Government were to accept the proposals which were put forward by the Arab Delegations at Lancaster House or if, on the other

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hand, they were to agree to the Partition of Palestine, they would be unable to adopt either course in practice without first obtaining the formal approval of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, we were to adopt a solution of the kind suggested by the British Delegation at the first session of this Conference, it would probably not be necessary in law to obtain their formal approval. It is our view, however, that even so it would be expedient to refer our proposals to the United Nations. Whatever policy we may think best, we cannot implement it on our own authority alone: we must seek at least an expression of opinion from the United Nations.

Discussion of Palestine at New York is therefore inevitable. This is an additional complication which we must consider together. If we reach agreement here, we shall also have to agree on the way in which we propose to communicate our agreement to the United Nations. Even if there should be no agreement between us on a policy, I hope we may still be able to reach an understanding about the form in which the problem should be referred to the United Nations. That is a subject which I think we can profitably discuss, perhaps by means of a Committee which would report back to the full Conference.

The Colonial Secretary thinks this a matter for the Cabinet rather than the Conference

May I now say a word about the various alternative plans for Palestine's future. At our first session, the Arab Delegations presented certain constitutional proposals; but the Conference was adjourned before the British Delegation had indicated their final attitude towards these. You are no doubt waiting to hear what we think of these proposals. We have considered them very carefully, remembering (as I have just reminded you) that if we accepted them we should have to join with you in sponsoring them before the General Assembly

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in New York. As I have already said, we have not excluded these or any other proposals from further consideration, but I am bound to say that they do appear to us to present very grave difficulties.

Your proposals provide for a democratic State, and would form an admirable basis for the constitution of a country in which the whole population was in broad agreement on the nature of the state it wished to establish. But any government, if it is to be democratic in practice, must receive a sufficient measure of consent from a sufficient proportion of its subjects. A minority which is sufficiently strong and sufficiently determined to make ordered government difficult or impossible can prevent the democratic functioning of any State. I am bound to say that I think the Jews of Palestine, who now form one-third of the whole population, would refuse to co-operate in working a government of the kind you propose. Co-operation cannot be induced by force. And, frankly, I do not see how your plan could work in practice. Even to-day, the Palestine Jews give their first loyalty to their own institutions, although they have not reached the point of refusing altogether to co-operate with the British administration. If an attempt were made to substitute [a binational administration] [a state on the lines proposed] for the present form of government, [I am convinced] [it is likely] that the Jews would immediately assert their refusal to participate. If a purely Arab administration were then established, the Jews, even if they did not resort to violence, could make its task virtually impossible by refusing to pay taxes and by other forms of passive resistance. If the Arab Government attempted to coerce them, the result would be civil war. Furthermore, even in the transition period, I do not see how the constitutional process, as it is described in your proposals, could be set in motion against Jewish opposition. You provide - rightly in my view - for a

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Provisional Government containing Jewish Ministers. Frankly, I think that it would not be possible to form any such Government. If we went ahead without the Jews and set up a purely Arab Government, we should immediately provoke a rebellion. Then we should have to decide either to use British troops to crush it or to come to terms with it and modify our policy. I would even go so far as to say that, as a result either of a rebellion during the period of transition or of a civil war following the establishment of the independent state, the Arab proposals might in practice lead straight to the conclusion which I believe you want to avoid, namely Partition. It may be that the destiny of Palestine is Partition: but I cannot believe that anyone would wish that destiny to be realised through bloodshed and exhaustion. If the end is to be Partition, surely it could be reached by some more peaceful route. And Partition is one of the possibilities to which we must give serious consideration. As you know, there are many people in this country, and in other countries too, who believe that the only way of securing peace in Palestine is to decide now in favour of Partition. There are, of course, difficulties in the way of this solution also. I need not enlarge upon these. You are quite as well qualified as I am to point out those difficulties.


A third possibility is that we may still be able to find some intermediate solution which would avoid some at least of the dangers and difficulties to which I have drawn attention in the proposals of the Arab Delegations, without however involving the extreme measure of splitting the country into two separate parts. We should like to make one more effort to see if it will be possible to reach agreement on a form of constitution which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in a single State and to work peacefully together for their common welfare.

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We do not think this is possible unless both peoples are made to feel secure. Somehow we must get rid of the fear felt by the Arabs that they will one day be dominated by a Jewish majority, and of the fear felt by the Jews that they would not be safe in an independent Palestine if the Arabs were in a permanent majority. Since I am speaking with Arabs now, it is this Jewish fear that I must ask you to take into account. I do not think it can be met unless the Jewish population of the country can be assured of a greater degree of self-government than is provided for in your proposals. There are many ways of attaining this objective. We are not going to ask you to re-consider your refusal to examine the plan of provincial autonomy which we put before you at Lancaster House. I do ask you, however, to join us in examining the possibility of some kind of constitution which would provide for areas in which Arabs and Jews would each exercise a large measure of self-government, but which would be held together in some sort of federal unity. We can then see whether it is possible to work out proposals which would give both peoples a sense of security in their own areas, while providing for the growth of the habit of co-operation between them in a central Government.



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PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Tenth Meeting held at 1 Carlton Gardens, London, S.W.1., on Tuesday, 4th February, 1947, at 3 p.m.

PRESENT:-

UNITED KINGDOM

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook
Secretary of the Cabinet

FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Robert Howe
Mr W.E. Houston Boswall
Mr C.W. Baxter
Mr H. Beeley
Mr J.P.E.C. Henniker-Major

COLONIAL OFFICE

Mr J.M. Martin
Sir Douglas Harris

ARAB DELEGATIONS

EGYPT

His Excellency Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha
His Excellency Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey
M. Abdel Moneim Mostafa

M. Mohamed Mostafa Yassin

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IRAQ

His Excellency Dr Fadhil Jamali

M. Arkhan Abadi

M. Bashaian

LEBANON

His Excellency Camille Bey Chamoun

M. Victor Khoury

M. Nadim Dimechkie

Miss Serjeant

Mr J. Shadid

PALESTINE ARABS

Jamal Bey Husseini

Dr Hussein Khalidi

Emile Effendi Ghoury

Sami Effendi Taher

Dr Omar al Khalil

Yusuf Effendi Sahyoun

SAUDI-ARABIA

His Excellency Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

Shaikh Jamil Daud al Musallami

SYRIA

His Excellency Faris Bey Khouri

His Excellency Amir Adil Arslan

His Excellency Dr Najib Armenazi

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TRANSJORDAN

His Highness Abdul Majid Haidar

Hani Bey Hashim

His Excellency Dr Fawzi Bey Mulki

YEMEN

His Royal Highness Seif-al-Islam Abdullah

El Sayid Hassan Ali Ibrahim

Dr Adnan Tarcici

M. Najib Abu Ezz-ed-Din (Interpreter)

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Mr E.A. Armstrong	Secretary
Mr C.A. Gault) Mr W.A.C. Mathieson)	Assistant Secretaries
Mr S. Naish	Social Secretary.

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MR BEVIN asked whether the Arab Delegates were ready to express their views with regard to the statements made by the United Kingdom Delegation at the last meeting.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that he was ready, in the name of the Arab Delegates, to make a reply which had been agreed by them. He then proceeded as follows:-

The Arab Delegations listened to Mr Bevin's statement of last Thursday with due attention, and have given careful consideration to its contents. They wish to re-affirm their sincere desire to see peace, based on justice, prevail in Palestine. With this end in view, they desire, at the risk of some repetition, to emphasize the following points:

1. The Arabs are the lawful owners of Palestine, and as such are entitled to self-determination and to all the freedoms for which the two world wars were waged. To deprive them of those rights is neither moral nor just. They do not regard themselves as having been responsible for the Balfour Declaration or its consequences. They were not a party to the declaration, and have never acknowledged its validity. As Mr Bevin himself admitted, Palestine was never a British possession, and Great Britain therefore had no right to dispose of it in any way. Moreover, the British Government has on several occasions given formal assurances that the Balfour Declaration, in pledging support to the idea of a Jewish National Home, did not contemplate the establishment of a Jewish State. Further, the Arabs maintain that the Mandate itself, which they have always rejected, is consistent neither with the spirit nor with the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In applying it, the Mandatory Government has always placed emphasis upon the establishment of a Jewish

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National Home, while the fundamental rights of the Arabs mentioned therein have been entirely disregarded.

It should also be pointed out that the effects of the Declaration upon the status of Jews in other countries, have been deleterious. We submit that Zionism has been responsible for uprooting thousands of Jews in Europe who, had it not been for Zionist propaganda about the National Home, would have made good citizens in their own countries. Zionism is undermining the national loyalty of large sections of the Jewish communities in various countries and therefore is encouraging the growth of Anti-semitism and prejudicing the status of the Jews in various countries.

2. Reference is often made to the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the fact that they suffered greatly at Hitler's hands and it is suggested that they should be given Palestine as compensation. The Arabs, however, were not responsible for Hitler's acts, and there is no reason why they should be asked to pay and suffer for them. If any compensation is to be given to the Jews, it should be given by those who have made the suggestion, and at their own expense. Moreover, Hitlerism has been crushed and there is nothing to prevent the Jews once more living peacefully in Europe. It is well known that several thousand Jews would have returned from Palestine to Europe had not the Jewish Agency put pressure upon them to remain in Palestine.

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3. It is asserted that steps should be taken for the relief of Jewish refugees and that the gates of Palestine should be opened to them. But it has now been universally admitted that Palestine cannot provide a solution for the problem of refugees and displaced persons.. Moreover, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its sitting of 15th December 1946, unanimously adopted a resolution against the resettlement of displaced persons in such countries as Palestine, where this resettlement would be likely to disturb friendly relations with neighbouring countries, or likely to be harmful to the interests of the inhabitants of non-self governing countries like Palestine. The resolution of the United Nations, which is in paragraph 9 in the Appendix No.1 to the Constitution of the Refugees International Organization, reads as follows :-

> "G. The Organization should endeavour to carry out its functions in such a way as to avoid disturbing friendly relations between nations. In the pursuit of this objective, the Organization should exercise special care in cases in which the re-establishment or re-settlement of refugees or displaced persons might be contemplated either in countries contiguous to their respective countries of origin or in non-self governing countries.
>
> The Organization should give due weight among other factors to any evidence of genuine apprehension and concern felt in regard to such plans in the former case by the country of origin of the persons involved or, in the latter case, by the indigenous population of the non-self governing country in question." (United Nations Journal, No. 73, page 872).

This is published with the Constitution of the International Refugees Organization.

The Arabs regard continued Jewish immigration as a serious danger to their very existence. They therefore insist that immigration should be entirely stopped and that the British Government should honour its pledges, given in the White Paper of 1939, which declared that Great Britain's obligations in regard to the establishment

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
of a Jewish National Home had been fulfilled, and that immigration should be finally ended.

4. Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world. Geographically and historically, it is inseperable from the rest of the Arab world. To attempt to graft a foreign body on to the Arab world would be to place a serious obstacle in the way of Arab unity and co-operation. The Arabs can never therefore acquiesce in any proposal for a Zionist State or bridgehead in Palestine, or any part of it, and Mr Bevin's desire "to see the Middle East settled as a regional unity" can never be fulfilled so long as the political ambitions of the Zionists remain unchecked.

5. Events have already shown how fully are justified the Arab fears of Jewish political designs. The idea of a "National Home", which at first was interpreted in cultural and spiritual terms, has now been developed into the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine. Even this is only the first step in the Zionist programme. The Arabs know the aggressive imperialistic nature of Zionism, and insist that the danger from it be eliminated once and for all.

6. The Arab States are se iously concerned about the maintenance of peace, security and inter-religious harmony in their countries. There are hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Arab world, who have always lived at peace with their neighbours, but now the problem of Palestine is embarrassing them, and rendering their position difficult. Unless a just solution be found for the problem, it will be difficult for the Arab Governments to maintain peace and harmony between Jew and non-Jew throughout the Arab countries.

7. We submit that it is not morally right to regard the Arabs of Palestine as standing on the same level as the Jews. The Arabs have a natural right to the country,


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while the Jews have been forced upon them. The Delegations of the Arab States have been most generous in their proposal to recognize, as equal citizens, those Jews who have acquired Palestinian citizenship and spent a reasonable number of years in the country, and to assure their final settlement therein. It is for these new-comers to adapt themselves to the requirements and plans of the original inhabitants, rather than for the rightful inhabitants to be forced to acquiesce in the designs of the new-comers. The Arabs have already suffered and sacrificed much as a result of the attempt to establish a Jewish National Home, and they can do no more without danger to their very existence. It is time that this was appreciated by all concerned. We insist that the Arabs alone have the right to say the last word in any settlement of the problem.

8. The Arabs wish to live in a Palestine which is a single undivided unit, and to lead therein an independent and democratic national life. The rights of those Jews who have acquired citizenship legally will be guaranteed in the same way as those of the Arab inhabitants. The Jews need have no fear of the Arab majority, for the whole course of Arab history demonstrates the liberality of the Arabs towards those who live amongst them, to whatever race or faith they may belong.

9. The Governments and peoples of the Arab States are determined never to allow the Arabs of Palestine to become victims of the Jewish minority. They will not therefore permit the opposition and claims of the Jews to stand in the way of their independence and constitutional life. Nor will they ever accept for them the status of a minority in their own homeland. This is the fundamental reason of their opposing further immigration.

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10. The Arab delegations will not enter upon any discussions in regard to partition or to any scheme which implies partition in any form. They wholly and unreservedly reject such schemes which the Arabs will oppose with every means at their disposal. It has indeed been made clear from the very beginning that the Arab delegations have not come to London to discuss partition, or any scheme which might lead to it. A decision to that effect was taken by the individual Arab States, and by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the States members of the Arab League, held in Alexandria in June 1946. This decision was unanimously confirmed by the Council of the Arab League, and has already been conveyed to the British Government through diplomatic channels.

11. After long and careful consideration, the Arab delegations are convinced that the scheme they have put forward is the most just and practicable possible. They regard this scheme as being in accordance with the most fundamental principles of democracy. No other scheme can guarantee democratic life and justice for all citizens of Palestine. The Arab proposals, if properly understood, should fully satisfy enlightened world opinion.

It was suggested in Mr Bevin's statement that it might be necessary to refer the problem to the United Nations. The Arab delegations do not admit the necessity of such a course. If the British Government was to accept the Arab proposals, it need go to the United Nations simply to announce the independence of Palestine as was done in the case of Transjordan. If however the British Government desired to submit the problem to the United Nations the Arabs cannot object. In that case, however, they would not regard themselves as bound by the present scheme, but would hold themselves free to present their case to the United Nations ab initio.

Mr Bevin referred further to the possibility of Jewish opposition to the Arab scheme if an attempt was made to put it into practice. We submit, however, that the Jews have no right to oppose such a scheme which grants them so much that is not strictly theirs. If they were wise and wished

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to live in peace with the Arabs, they should welcome the scheme and begin a new life of co-operation with the Arabs. We insist moreover that Jewish terrorism, which has been allowed to persist and grow by the leniency of the Government, can never sway the Arabs from their determination to defend their rights and stand by their legitimate demands. They are convinced that if left to themselves, they are quite capable of dealing with terrorism without the intervention of British troops.

Mr Bevin expressed some apprehension about the probability of Jewish passive resistance if the Arab scheme were carried out without Jewish participation in it. This however cannot be regarded as a serious objection to the scheme. The Jewish community in Palestine is a highly complex industrial and commercial community and, as such, cannot exist unless it is prepared to co-operate with the Government. Its whole economic life depends upon the goodwill both of the Government and the surrounding Arab world. If the Arab scheme was seriously carried out, the Jewish community would be bound to adapt itself to the new order of things and to seek the goodwill of the Arabs.

In short the Arab Delegations wish to declare that, after further deliberation they are convinced that the proposals they have already submitted represent the greatest contribution they can possibly make towards the solution of the problem of Palestine. They desire to assure the British Delegation that these proposals were drafted in a spirit of the greatest generosity and realism, and were put forward frankly and sincerely, and without any thought of bargaining. It is the considered judgment of all the Arab Delegations that only the adoption of the Arab proposals for Palestine can guarantee peace and stability in the Middle East.

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Faris Bey closed his remarks by saying that the statement which he had just read was a formal reiteration of the fundamental Arab position. The British Delegation would find in it nothing new but the Arab Delegations had considered it useful to repeat their main points and make their position as clear as possible. On two issues they were absolutely inflexible.

(1) They could not contemplate any form of partition in Palestine or the establishment there of a Jewish state.

(2) Jewish immigration into Palestine must cease.

If these two points could be conceded and settled once and for all there was prospect of peace and security in the Middle East.

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H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN:- Before considering in more detail the substance of the statement made by the Head of the British Delegation, the Lebanese Delegation wish to give their opinion on that passage of the British exposé of the 27th January in which Mr Bevin stated:-

"The present situation cannot be allowed to continue. I do not think that Great Britain deserves it. The part she has played in two wars and the price she has paid in blood and money and tears entitles her to the most serious consideration."

The Lebanese Delegation are the first to regret that the situation in Palestine should have become so serious, and in this they believe they interpret the feelings of all concerned. They regret it as much for the sake of the British and Arab lives which are lost through terrorist activity as for the serious threat which this activity constitutes to the rights of the people of Palestine. However, the Lebanese Delegation, whilst deploring these consequences, cannot but point out that, if the Jewish problem had not been created in 1917 and 1918, and if Jewish immigration had not been encouraged during the course of the last 29 years, the people of Palestine and their British friends would have continued to live in peace and harmony.

The Lebanese Delegation wish to re-affirm their utmost sympathy for the sufferings which the British people endured in the course of the last two great wars, as also their admiration for the immense efforts made by the British to achieve the triumph of the high principles inspiring them, and would express their most sincere wishes for the happiness and prosperity of the people of this country.

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At the same time, they earnestly hope that the British Delegation are inspired by similar feelings with regard to the peoples represented at this Conference and that, in the final settlement of the vital Palestinian problem, they will again prove true to their friendship and to the high principles for which this country fought.

It is unnecessary to speak again of the importance of Palestine to the Arab World, or of the far-reaching repercussions, either happy or unhappy, which will attend the conclusion of our debate. I shall confine myself to saying that, if the Arab countries resent profoundly and with bitterness the one-sided policy followed up to the present day and insist upon an equitable solution of this problem, it is not only because they are linked to Palestine by a common heritage of language, blood and tradition, nor solely because of the presence in their midst of an ever-increasing and hostile foreign element, which constitutes a grave menace to the peace of the Middle East, but above all because the cause of the Arabs of Palestine is a just one and their rights over their country are inalienable.

In order to facilitate understanding of the gravity of the injustice done to Palestine, I would ask the British Delegation to substitute for a moment the words "Great Britain" for the word "Palestine" and to say what would be the reaction of this country if a third Power were to impose upon her an alien element whose presence was of a nature to disrupt her national life and her political and territorial unity. There can be no doubt as to the re-action of the British people, nor would there in such circumstances be any question of the generosity advocated by the British Delegation.

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Palestine can hardly be expected to re-act in a different manner from another nation equally conscious of her rights and aspirations. The fact that Great Britain is a powerful nation and Palestine a small country in no way changes the situation.

In this same statement, as well as in that of the 30th January, Mr Bevin spoke of the Balfour Declaration and of the obligations incumbent upon Great Britain by virtue of the Mandate with which she was invested by the League of Nations.

During the previous meetings of September, 1946, the Arab Delegations expressed their opinion concerning the Balfour Declaration, which was made without their consent, unknown to them and contrary to the promises of independence made to the Arabs. They likewise expressed their opinion regarding the Mandate imposed upon them. We shall not again repeat what has been said on this subject. However, since the Head of the British Delegation bases his arguments on the Mandate and its implications, let us again study the text of this Mandate, let us read it through twice so that we may understand not a part but all of its implications:-

(1) Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads:- Paragraph 4: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."

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These principles, which are at the very foundation of all mandates, make it obligatory for a Mandatory Power to respect the integrity of the territories under mandate and the right of their population to achieve self-government and to guide them towards a state of complete independence. It ensues that the Mandatory Power is bound not only to encourage this population to reach a state of independence, but also to obviate any circumstances likely to retard the realisation of this object. What has been done to Palestine is quite contrary to the obligations under the mandate. As has often been stated, the fact that Palestine has not been granted her independence in the same way as Irak, Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan is not due to any shortcomings on the part of her population, but to the influx of a foreign element which has prevented the realisation of her aspirations.

(2) The mandate imposed upon Palestine, although it provided for a National Home for the Jews and indeed because it provides for this National Home, made all the more imperative the obligation of the Mandatory Power to respect the rights of the Palestinian people.

Article 6: "The administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration..."

The fundamental principle underlying this text is the respect of the rights and of the position of the Arab population of Palestine. On condition that these rights and this position are not jeopardised, and on this condition only, may Jewish immigration be facilitated.

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It is important to note that in the text of Article 6, we read not only the word "rights", which should in itself be enough to safeguard the interests of the Arabs of Palestine, but also the word "position", which means the general status of this Palestinian population. The obligation to maintain this general status precludes the reduction of the area of Palestine, the diminution of the Arab majority by any means whatsoever or the weakening of its aptitude to govern its own country.

The subsequent interpretations given by the British Government or by prominent spokesmen to this text, although hardly favourable to the point of view of the Palestinian Arabs, limit the conception of the Jewish National Home to that of a spiritual and material asylum and repudiate any possible claim to domination over all or a part of Palestine by the Jews.

A. The Churchill Memorandum of 1922 stressed:-

(1) That His Majesty's Government did not contemplate the creation of a wholly Jewish Palestine or the disappearance or subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine.

(11) That the terms of the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine.

B. The findings of the Shaw Commission in 1930 contained the following recommendations:-

(1) That the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy defining the meaning it attached to the passage in the Mandate concerning the safeguarding of the

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rights of the non-Jewish communities and laying down more explicit directions as to the conduct of policy in such vital issues as land-tenure and immigration.

(11) That the Government should issue a clear statement regarding Jewish immigration and should review the machinery for its regulation and control with the object of preventing a repetition of the "excessive" Jewish immigration of 1925 and 1926. That non-Jewish interests should be given some voice in the discussions on immigration.

It is interesting to note in passing that the Shaw Commission warned the British Government of the dangers of immigration at a time when the number of Jewish immigrants did not yet exceed a total of 150,000 persons, according to official statistics.

C. An English historian, Mr Harold Nicholson, who in his time assisted Sir Mark Sykes in drafting the Balfour Declaration, analysed the meaning of this Declaration in an article in the Spectator of 3rd January, 1947, as follows:-

"Such was the basis of the promises which we made to Zionism. We never promised a Jewish State. All we promised was a National Home in Palestine, and that promise was explicitly conditional on the maintenance of the rights of the Arabs."

D. Finally, let us consider the White Paper of 1939: During the session of the 30th January, the Colonial Secretary stated that, although this plan was adopted by the British Parliament, it was never approved by the League of Nations and for this reason the British Government did not feel itself bound by its terms. However, the Colonial Secretary forgets that the British Government felt itself bound by the White Paper to such an extent that

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it carried out its terms faithfully in so far as they concerned the acceptance on Palestinian territory of the Jewish contingent for which it provides. It is, to say the least, surprising that a decision should be considered valid for one section of the people and not valid when applied to the other.

Be this as it may, the above-mentioned document contains the following statement by the British Government:- "His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years, which is now contemplated, has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration, regardless of the wishes of the Arab Population."

The policy of the British Government can no longer continue to be, as in the past, a one-sided policy. Her obligations by virtue of the Mandate are in the first place to safeguard the rights and the position of the Arabs of Palestine. These obligations are in direct opposition:-

(1) To any partition of Palestine.

(11) To any further immigration, thus endangering the rights of the Arabs over all or over a part of Palestine.

(111) To the constitution of any state other than an Arab State within the present frontiers of Palestine.

During the session of the 30th January, the British Delegation submitted to the Conference a proposal relating to the creation in Palestine of autonomous provinces under the authority of a common central Government.

I imagine that, when the British Delegation put forth this proposal, it intended the central Government to be that of the independent State of Palestine.

However, this proposal in no way dispels the danger which threatens the Palestinian Arabs and in no way conforms

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to the obligations of Great Britain under the mandate.

Mr Bevin said: "Somehow we must get rid of the fear felt by the Arabs that they will one day be dominated by a Jewish majority."

But, in answer to a question put to him, Mr Bevin further stated: "That each community would be responsible within its own area for its own immigrants."

This conception leaves the door open to immigration and to the danger of the Jewish element one day becoming the majority in Palestine. This majority will not only be dominant in the administration of the Jewish area, but will inevitably make itself felt in the central administration of the Federal Government of Palestine. Mr Bevin added that "There would be provision to prevent excessive immigration." Unfortunately, we no longer stand at the beginning of the era of immigration. Mr Bevin recognised that 700,000 immigrants have already entered Palestine. Any further immigration, whatever its nature, would be fatal to the rights of the Arabs and to their position.

As to the liberties and rights claimed by or for the Jews, they are, as has been confirmed, fully guaranteed by the provision contained in the proposals of the Arab States.

The Jews begged refuge of Palestine. The plan submitted by the Arab States grants to all those who are willing to collaborate sincerely in reconstructing the State of Palestine equality of rights and citizenship. It recognises the right of the Jews to use their own language and develop their own spiritual and scholastic institutions and allows them free access to and administration of their Holy Places, and their own law-courts in matters touching their personal status. Further, as an independent Palestine would become a member of the Arab League, this plan affords unlimited scope for the development of the technical, industrial and commercial

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activity of the Jews.

We do not think it conceivable that any one could reproach the Arab States with failing to show a spirit of conciliation, liberalism and indeed generosity.

The explanations furnished by the Colonial Secretary during previous sessions are not conclusive. When the Colonial Secretary deduces that, since the Jews are determined to enter Palestine illegally, we should bow down to their wishes and satisfy their ambitions, he seems thereby to advocate a twofold shirking of responsibilities, on the one hand by Great Britain, and by the Arabs, on the other, in their duty towards a country which has been theirs since time immemorial. This would indeed be nothing less than a continuation of the one-sided policy which has been followed up to the present time.

All Arabs, without distinction of country, religion or political beliefs, await with intense anxiety the outcome of our discussions. In spite of certain inevitable family quarrels, the Arab and the British Peoples feel themselves united by a similar tradition of chivalry, hospitality and tolerance. They are united by a common social ideology and a common economic system. Their interests and their high policy incontestably go hand in hand and the prospect of a happy future of close co-operation opens before them. But an unhappy settlement of the Palestinian problem threatens to annihilate all our hopes. Such a settlement would instigate a prolonged era of hatred and suspicion where, under normal conditions, there should reign a spirit of sincere and friendly collaboration.

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H.E. HAKKI BEY said he was certain that the collective answer delivered on behalf of the Arab Delegations by Faris Bey Khouri and the further masterly contribution by the Lebanese Minister must have made the Arab attitude perfectly clear. He affirmed that the Egyptian Delegation could not contemplate the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine or any form of Partition of that country and that they could not compromise on the question of further Jewish immigration. In support of further Jewish immigration the argument was frequently advanced that this would enable a large number of displaced persons from central Europe to find homes in Palestine. If the object was to increase the number of Jews in Palestine, then it was a political object, with a view to realising the Zionist ambition of establishing a Jewish majority in that country. Such a political object could not be tolerated by the Arabs. If it were a humanitarian object to relieve the distress of displaced persons, he could not see why there should be discrimination in this matter between Jews and other races who had been displaced. In any case, there was an international body established to deal with this problem of displaced persons and the problem of the displaced Jews in central Europe must be dealt with by them. The Arabs would, therefore, insist that Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease.

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H.E. DR. JAMALI expressed the support of the Iraqi Delegation to the statement delivered by H.E. Faris Bey Khouri in the drafting of which all Delegations had taken part. There were two fundamental points, however, which he wished to emphasise. The first was that the Arabs did not regard either the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration as being right or just. Both transgressed fundamental human rights, the right of peoples to self-determination and to order the government of their own territories. Both the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration were an imposition on the Arabs of Palestine. They had no moral justification and were in fact a form of aggression. The Arabs insisted that they were the legal owners of the country and they could not accept any situation in which they were regarded as merely on the same level as the Jews in Palestine. In the plan they had submitted to the Conference, the Arabs had done their utmost to recognise that the problem had some difficulties and they had attempted to meet those difficulties with the greatest generosity.


The second point he wished to make related to the question of human relationships in the Middle East. Did the Jews imagine that they could live as a state in the Arab world surrounded by hostile neighbours. Would British bayonets for ever protect Zionist ambitions. The Jews should realise the importance of good relations with the Arabs if they wished to live in peace and prosperity in the Middle East. If Britain continued to protect by her

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strength the aggressive programme of the Zionists he felt that Anglo-Arab friendship was in danger. He wished to be quite frank, even blunt, in putting this point to the British Delegation because he believed that the Arab peoples attached the greatest importance to friendly relations with the United Kingdom. The Arabs believed that Great Britain was their best friend and they needed that friendship. But every Arab equally felt that Great Britain was responsible for Zionism. It was difficult for those who wished to cherish and increase this Anglo-Arab friendship to explain to the Arabs why Great Britain had supported and continued to support Zionist aggression. The Arabs believed that Great Britain had always stood for the fundamental principles of international morality. British support of Zionism was a contradiction of this principle which the Arabs found it very difficult to understand.

Both the future of the Jews in the Middle East and the future of Anglo-Arab friendship depended upon a removal of the Zionist threat and a cessation of British support for Zionist expansionist aims.

H.E. FARIS BEY said he wished to ask two questions, firstly, whether the Arabs could be assured that the British Government did not feel itself bound



to create a Jewish State in Palestine, and secondly, on the question of immigration. He regarded the question of immigration as having been settled by two documents -

1. The White Paper of 1939 where the suspension of immigration had been confirmed by the British Parliament; and
2. The resolution of the United Nations, covering displaced persons, which had been adopted by the U.S.A. and by Great Britain.

MR. BEVIN said that he had listened with much interest to what had been said, but he was sorry to have to say that a solution of the problem seemed no nearer. The problem was so acute that a solution must be found. As regards Faris Bey's questions, he said that the British Government had neither accepted nor rejected Partition, that is to say, the creation of a Jewish State. It was their desire to see how near they could bring the two parties to accepting some compromise solution which would allow of self-government and which would also be agreeable to world opinion. Until the British Government knew whether they would fail or succeed in this they could give no definite answer on Partition.

As regards the White Paper, it was necessary to make it clear that the Labour Party, to which Mr. Bevin belonged, had never accepted the 1939 White Paper.

As regards the resolution of U.N.O. concerning displaced persons, Mr. Bevin doubted whether it applied

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to the specific case of Palestine. He agreed that the British Government had supported it and he thought it might be that Palestine was in the minds of those who drafted the resolution, but he was not sure that it was in the minds of those who eventually voted for the resolution.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that he personally was sure that the United States supported the resolution as referring to Palestine, on the basis of an amendment put forward by the Egyptian Delegation to the United Nations.

MR. BEVIN went on to say that in his opinion the Palestine question was not solely a refugee question. It was a problem of peculiar interest to all Jews. He much regretted that it had not been possible for Arabs and Jews to meet together and argue this out. The Jews were continually emphasising that an Arab representative, the Emir Faisal, had made an agreement with Dr. Weizman in Paris in 1919. It was true that the agreement was never implemented, because Syria and the Lebanon had not at that time become independent, but 25 years later these two countries gained their independence. Consequently it could be argued that the 1919 agreement now stood fulfilled even though this had come about 25 years later. He felt that it could also be argued that the Mandate contained the substance of the Weizman-Faisal agreement. All the obligations which H.M.G. had accepted towards the Arabs had been carried out except for the grant of independence to Palestine. Trans-Jordan was now free.
Jewish claims had been made that

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Transjordan was part of the original Palestine and therefore should not have been treated differently from Palestine itself.

The Mandate envisaged a Jewish Home in Palestine, but not a Jewish State there. The two peoples however were so bitterly opposed that he asked himself whether a unitary State would work at all. If it did not work, was it necessary that the issue should be fought out, and in that case should the British withdraw their administration and their troops?

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI intervened to say that it would be better for the Arabs if the British withdrew.

MR. BEVIN said that that would have to be considered. Britain could go to the United Nations and say that she could no longer bear the burden of Palestine. If she left Palestine, it might be that Palestine would become a danger to world peace and then somebody must step in - the United Nations, or some other power. Britain would however be sorry to see such a result.

H.E. FARIS BEY said that whether or not the Labour Party accepted the 1939 White Paper, the Government of the day was agreed upon it. Was it possible for a new Government to repudiate the decisions of its predecessors in the field of foreign policy? If that were so, how could the Arabs have any confidence in Great Britain at all. The White Paper was issued only after long discussions and it

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would be dishonourable for His Majesty's Government to deny it now and change British policy.

MR. BEVIN said that he did not wish to repudiate the 1939 White Paper but as a member of the Labour Party he was entitled to say that that party had always voted against it and was therefore entitled to try and bring about a change. Such a change would of course be brought about by negotiation.

H.E. FARIS BEY said that the Arabs did not wish the British Government to seek to make any change.

MR. BEVIN said that the Labour Party had always felt that an injustice had been done in 1939.

H.E. FARIS BEY said that the White Paper had been submitted to the Mandates Committee of the League of Nations and but for the war would no doubt have been confirmed. He hoped that the British Government realised the implications of that.

MR. BEVIN said that if necessary his Government would be prepared to seek the agreement of U.N.O. to a change. He felt that simply because a policy had once been agreed, this did not necessarily mean that it could never be changed.

H.E. FARIS BEY expressed the opinion that U.N.O. should be asked to confirm the White Paper.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that the immigration question had always been considered from a political point of view. He wished to consider it rather from a social point of view and to ask Mr. Bevin's advice as a socialist statesman. Palestine was a small barren country. Its area was 10,000 square miles and it had a population of 2 million. This gave 200 inhabitants to the square mile. British experts

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had always declared that only one-quarter of the area of Palestine could be developed and populated. The true population density should therefore be 750 to the square mile. He felt that no socialist would deny that this was a serious situation. British experts had also declared that the smallest area of land suitable for the maintenance of an Arab family was 111 dunams. In fact, the average Arab family had only 45 dunams and for decent living they had the right to more. The situation was made worse because of the exclusive attitude of the Jews. Every dunam which passed into Jewish possession was lost to the Arabs because the Jews would not then allow any Arab to work on it or to buy it back. Most serious, however, was the natural increase of the Palestine population. The rate of increase for the Arabs was 55 per thousand; for the Jews, 29 per thousand; and for the Christians 33 per thousand. This gave a yearly increase of 80,000 souls. In the past 25 years, the population of Palestine had doubled, leaving all immigration out of account, and in the next 20 years it might be expected that it would double itself again. Could Mr. Bevin, as a socialist, advocate such a density of population? In the face of all this, the Arabs were asked to give more away to the Jews. He regarded it as unjust and immoral. The Arabs had had high hopes of obtaining justice from a Socialist Government in this respect. It was a matter which had nothing to do with Arabs or Jews or the Mandate. It was a social problem covering all communities and it was on that that he wanted Mr. Bevin's advice as to whether in these circumstances, more immigration was desirable.

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MR BEVIN pointed out that it was possible by enterprise and development to increase the area of land suitable for habitation. He also said that the population of neighbouring Arab States such as Transjordan had not increased at the same rate as that of Palestine.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that the population of Transjordan had doubled itself and other delegates' said that in Egypt and the Lebanon the population had also increased greatly.

MR BEVIN said that no one wanted more than he did to see a development of the unproductive areas of the Middle East.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI said that for 25 years the British had promised Iraq intensive cultivation and the development of unproductive areas, but because of the shortage of water this had not yet become possible. In Palestine, the Jews because of their attitude to the water question had been a barrier to Arab development. In Palestine the Arabs had been striving for many years for a just definition of rights over water, but they had never obtained satisfaction from the British Government, which had been influenced by the Jews. In industry too the Jews would not allow the Arabs to be employed with the result that the Arabs were at a serious disadvantage in industrial development. If this state of affairs were allowed to continue the Arabs would be justified in saying that they had no hope of helping the generations of the future.

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H.E. DR. JAMALI suggested that scientific facts were being distorted for political ends in Palestine by the Zionists. Were the Arabs to depend on the reports of British experts, or on reports of Zionist experts? He personally had always believed in the impartiality of the British, and he would like to continue to do so. With regard to the achievements of the Jews within the last twenty-five years, Dr. Jamali suggested that this was much too short a period on which to judge. The population problem must be looked at from the long term point of view. In one hundred years the population of Palestine might be trebled and future policy should be determined by long-term considerations of this kind.

MR. CREECH JONES, dealing with the question of discrimination in Palestine, said that under the Mandate it was impossible for the Mandatory to offer special privileges to other countries. The Mandatory had to abide by the principle of non-discrimination and there was a limit to what the administration could do. In general taxes on imports into Palestine had not been heavy. Dealing with the suggestion that the Jews would not permit the Arabs to work, Mr Creech Jones said that thirty years ago the population of Palestine was only a fraction of what it was at present. No one could deny that since then, the whole economic outlook of the country had changed, largely because new capital had been introduced from outside making possible the development of communications, the draining of marshes, the

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extension of irrigation, etc. The result had been to increase the field of employment for the Arabs and to raise the standard of living for both Arabs and Jews. In this respect the economic condition of Palestine bore favourable comparison with that of surrounding countries. It was true that in many settlements the Jews refused to employ the Arabs, but it could not be denied that Jewish enterprise brought economic opportunities to the Arabs and to Palestine in general. He did not believe that the Jews had been responsible for creating a landless class of Arabs. Palestine could not carry a population two or three times as great as when it first came under the Mandate. The country ought to be able to support an even greater population in the future by the application of scientific methods to the development of the country.

It was true that the White Paper of 1939 was endorsed by Parliament but it was not a treaty, nor had it been endorsed internationally. Nevertheless the Mandate was there and was considered valid in the judgment of the majority of the nations of the world. But the world was changing and, whatever the Mandate said, we were faced with a formidable problem threatening the peace of the Middle East, economic breakdown in Palestine and repercussions in the whole field of international relations. It might be argued that Britain should withdraw from Palestine, but what would the consequences be? Almost

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certainly war between Arabs and Jews but this was not all; there would be an increase in the flow of Jews into Palestine which the Arabs could not prevent. The forces behind this movement of Jews would be financed by Jewish funds from the United States. The prospect was one of turmoil for years.

The statement made on behalf of the Arab Delegates that afternoon implied that there was no room for accommodation with the British point of view and that the status quo should be maintained. That attitude did not help to solve the problem and it didno good to hark back to the events of thirty years ago. It was quite impossible to maintain the status quo. Even if Britain asked the United Nations to take over the problem, there would be some delay before they could do so, and it was unlikely that they would have resources to restore peace at an early date.

What alternative proposals had the Arabs to put forward? They had rejected the proposals put forward by the British Delegation and it appeared that the Conference had made no progress at all. He begged the Arab Delegates to make a serious practical effort to solve the problem.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI suggested that if the United Kingdom Delegates would examine the many reports which had been submitted by British experts on the possibilities of development in

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Palestine, they would change many of their views. He drew attention to a statement made at the recent Zionist Conference at Basle to the effect that the Jewish colonies in Palestine were in debt to the extent of £15 million. They were in effect paupers living on charity. What would be the condition of the Jewish settlers if there were to be a world slump?

It was untrue to say that the Jews had been responsible for the draining of marshes. The two biggest marshes had been drained by the Supreme Moslem Council. The Huleh Marsh had been reclaimed by the Government with public money and given to the Jews. This was altogether unjust.

It was the British Government who had made the Balfour Declaration and created the situation in the Middle East. They were now asking the Arabs to acquiesce in another Balfour Declaration which would go further than the previous one. If that were the demand, no Arab would agree to it.

MR DIMECHKIE suggested that Mr Creech Jones had drawn his information about the economic situation in Palestine from Jewish sources. It was true that there was no discrimination in Palestine against foreign powers, but there was discrimination in the interests of Jewish industries against the interests of the Arab consumers who were not able to get the goods they desired as cheaply as they otherwise would. As regards improvements in Palestine, it had to be borne in mind that many improvements had also been made

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in other parts of the Arab world where there had been no Jewish immigration. Moreover, in Palestine the citrus industry was an Arab industry, and the Arabs had the majority of the holdings. These were the only holdings which could flourish in normal times. It was not true to suggest that the Jews had not been responsible for creating a large number of landless Arabs. The poorer Arabs had been those who suffered most in this respect.

Mr Dimechkie joined with Jamal Bey Husseini in appealing to Mr Bevin as a Socialist. Jews pretended to be Socialists, but he did not understand how they could be both Socialists and Zionists as Zionism was the negation of Socialism.

DR KHALIDI endorsed the views expressed by Jamal Bey Husseini. He suggested that, if the United Kingdom Delegates were to go to Palestine they would change their opinions. As to the possibility of intensively cultivating the country. he suggested that an examination should be made of the financial position of the Jewish colonies and industries. Very few of these undertakings could maintain themselves. It was important to bear in mind how deeply the younger generation of Arabs in Palestine felt about the problem. Any solution which was contrary to their wishes, would be an unsatisfactory solution. No solution could be a durable one which took account only of present conditions which were entirely artificial and temporary.

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H.E. DR FAWZI MULKI asked whether the object of Jewish immigration was to increase the number of Jews in Palestine or to relieve the distress of the Jews elsewhere.

MR BEVIN said that he understood that it had both objects in view.

H.E. HAKKI BEY said that the Jews wanted to dominate Palestine by increasing their numbers. The question of relieving the Jews in Europe was not a problem for Palestine but for a world organisation.

H.E. DR JAMALI said that if His Majesty's Government would look at the numerous Commission Reports which had been submitted to His Majesty's Government from the time of the Balfour Declaration, up to now, they would see that the situation had been going from bad to worse and becoming more and more complicated. It was more complicated now than in 1939, more complicated in 1939 than in 1929, more complicated in 1929 than in 1922. The new policy which the United Kingdom Delegates asked them to accept would add to the existing complication in that it involved an increase in the number of immigrants. The Arabs knew that the Jews intended to make a new invasion of Palestine. It would be a crusade, and the Arabs would oppose it as they had opposed the crusades of former times.

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MR. BEVIN said he would like to direct the attention of the Conference to the need for a political solution. They hadhad a useful discussion of the economic, scientific and cultural aspects of the problem, but it was a political solution which must be found.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI agreed that the essence of the problem was political. He recalled that in his opening statement he had said that the Arab States were advancing no new arguments. He believed that Mr. Bevin had expected them to produce some new suggestions which would harmonise the conflicting points of view.

MR. BEVIN confessed that that had been his hope.

H.E. FARIS BEY continued that in a desire to avoid a breakdown of the Conference he had on his own personal initiative put two questions to the British Delegation. Satisfactory answers to these questions would clear the main points of dissension. If the British Delegation could concede that there would be no question of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine and that a limit had now been reached to Jewish immigration, then he had hopes that some mutually agreeable solution could be worked out in discussion.

MR. BEVIN said these were two separate questions. Up to now, His Majesty's Government had been operating a Mandate under which they were obliged to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home. He had wished to

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discover what the feeling of the Arab States would be towards a proposal to terminate that Mandate by partition. He had been told that the Arab States might conceivably be prepared to acquiesce in the imposition of a solution by Partition, although they might not be prepared to agree to it in Conference. It had been suggested to him that opposition to Partition was possibly not as unrelenting as had been indicated by the Arab Delegations this afternoon. He wished to find out whether there was really strong opposition to the idea of separating the two peoples and thereby reaching finality on Jewish expansion.

H.E. DR. JAMALI said that as President of the Arab League Council at their latest session he had been authorised to communicate to the world press for publication a statement that the Arab League was inflexibly opposed to Partition as a solution of the Palestine problem. This statement had apparently not appeared in the British press, and Zionist propaganda had been at work to create the impression that the Arab States might acquiesce in such a solution if imposed by His Majesty's Government. He wished to reaffirm the unanimous decision of the Arab League Council that the States of the Arab League would never discuss or accept Partition. If any Arab said that he might consider Partition, it could be taken that that Arab represented himself alone and not the Arab peoples.

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In answer to a question by Mr Bevin, all Arab Delegations indicated that this was their unanimous view.

DR KHALIL said that if partition were imposed, the Arabs of Palestine would never acquiesce in it. Opposition would be much stronger than in the disturbances of 1937. The Palestinian Arabs would be prepared to sacrifice everything to oppose partition. In answer to a question by Mr Bevin, Dr Khalil said that by this he meant that the Arabs were prepared for war.

MR BEVIN asked if the Arabs adopted a similar attitude on the immigration question.

H.E. HAKKI BEY recalled Mr Bevin's remarks that, since the publication of the White Paper of 1939, circumstances had changed. Surely circumstances had also changed since the publication of the Balfour Declaration. He suggested that all previous pledges, promises and statements of policy should be set aside and the position examined as it was to-day. He believed that public opinion would be in favour of a cessation of immigration, if the question were examined in the light of the principles embodied in the decisions of the United Nations quoted in H.E. Faris Bey's opening speech. Mr Bevin had said that the Arab plan was admirable if only the Jews would collaborate. The Arabs were satisfied that the Jews would benefit from such a plan and he thought they would accept it if only their dreams of a State in Palestine were finally shown to be impossible and a definite end was put to Jewish immigration.

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MR. BEVIN said the Jews would never accept a plan in which they were condemned to the position of a permanent minority.

H.E. HAKKI BEY suggested that opposition to the Arab plan would come from those elements educated in irresponsible extremism and underground activities whom Mr. Bevin had mentioned in his speech at the previous session. He suggested that the opinion of those elements should be entirely disregarded, as they would resist any reasonable solution. All reasonable Jews would realise the economic and social advantages of taking their place in a democratic state as contemplated by the Arab plan.

JAMAL BEY HUSSEINI suggested that, as the British Government was forcing the Germans to adopt the principles of democracy, it should do the same to the Jews.

H.E. FARIS BEY KHOURI said that when in the United States he had asked prominent politicians why they supported Jewish immigration into Palestine. They had replied that their motives were purely humanitarian and that they wished to solve the problem of the displaced persons in Europe. He had pointed out that the United Nations had assumed responsibility for the problem of displaced persons and after much study had set up an International Refugee Organisation to solve it. Why then did the United States feel bound to solve it independently? If they did not sponsor Jewish immigration as a means to increase the Jewish population in Palestine so that they would have a majority in the country, why then did they not leave the humanitarian aspect of the problem to be settled by the International Refugee Organisation?

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The British Government had said that they would not agree to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. If that was so then only the humanitarian motive could permit them to support Jewish immigration. But this humanitarian aspect of the case was being looked after by the International Refugee Organisation. Support for Jewish immigration into Palestine was therefore unnecessary, and a great obstacle to co-operation with the Arabs was already removed.

MR. BEVIN said that, even if he were to say that His Majesty's Government would not contemplate the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, he was still faced with the immigration problem. Public opinion in this country believed that further Jewish immigration should take place, as could be seen by anyone who studied the liberal press. He approached the Conference table with the knowledge that some of the principal members of the Cabinet had already reached a definite conclusion on what solution should be adopted in Palestine. He wished to be able to tell his colleagues all the implications of any step which might be taken. Dr. Khalil had said that if partition were imposed it would mean war in Palestine. He could not contemplate war. A stage had been reached where after hearing what the Arabs and Jews had to say he would have to put before his


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colleagues in the Cabinet a suggestion for a solution which most reasonable people would think possible and acceptable. If he could devise no such solution, then all the pledges of the past must be put aside and His Majesty's Government must go to the United Nations and either hand over the problem to them, or seek their authority for a change in the provisions of the Mandate. He was bound to take into account all that had been said at the time of the framing of the Mandate, and in the light of that he felt that the Jews had some claim. He acknowledged that behind their claim was a religious ideal which was apt to make supporters of it unreasonable in their advocacy. While making all allowances for the impelling force of religious conviction, he still felt that the Jews had a reasonable basic claim. He was determined to evolve, with his colleagues, a proposal for a solution of the problem which would commend itself to all reasonable people. He was not prepared to enunciate such a proposal immediately, as he had wished to hear and study all that the Arab representatives had to say. He only wished that what they had said had been more helpful. He was very conscious that if a wrong decision on this problem were taken, and fighting were to break out in the Middle East, no one could say where it might end. He was haunted by the thought that, if this trouble between Jews and Arabs came to open conflict, the prospect would be opened up of other nations being drawn into this conflict. The Middle East was a rich and tempting territory and once disturbance started

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there it might spread and involve all who had an acquisitive interest in that area.

H.E. DR JAMALI said that he was sure that Mr Bevin, in referring to the circumstances in which the Mandate had been framed had in mind the Feisal-Weizmann agreement. He could testify that King Feisal had many times said that he regarded that agreement as null and void. It had been completely invalidated by the fact that provisions contained in the Arabic Appendix had never been realised. All that King Feisal had said was that, if a united Arab kingdom were established in the Middle East, the Arab people would welcome the Jews to come and live with them as neighbours and friends in the same way as the Armenian community lived in Iraq. He had never contemplated anything like the establishment of a Jewish state in the Arab world, but was prepared to welcome the Jews to come and live in the Arab world as citizens of the Arab kingdom.


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H.E. CAMILLE BEY CHAMOUN said that the United Kingdom Delegates seemed to think that unless the Arabs sacrificed their rights in Palestine no settlement was possible. Immigration meant in the end a Jewish majority.

MR. BEVIN interjected ~~that~~ this was reading too much into what had been said. There was a difference between continuing immigration and creating an ultimate Jewish majority.

H.E. CAMILLE BEY then said that Mr Creech Jones had said that too much emphasis should not be put on the past. What then became of the Arab rights in Palestine under the Mandate. The British Government appeared to regard Palestine only from the point of view of a Jewish National Home, thus ignoring the rights of the Arabs. It was essential that the national rights of the Arabs to Palestine be not prejudiced. The U.S.A. and Great Britain only accepted small quotas of immigrants yet Great Britain was now insisting that Palestine accept relatively large numbers of Jewish immigrants. Was not the Jewish National Home already in existence in Palestine?

MR. CREECH JONES said that his point had been misunderstood. What he wished to make clear was that times had changed in the last 25 years and that he was anxious that the Conference should consider the problems of the moment without being unduly influenced by the past.

H.E. DR. JAMALI interjected that it was not right to try and force a solution on the Arabs.

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MR. BEVIN said that while he would always struggle for agreement he would not force a settlement on the Arabs. He would try in the light of world opinion to solve the problem. There was no more he could say that evening for he must first consult his Government. The British had a clear conscience over Palestine. He felt there was still a chance for a solution. He thanked the Arabs for their frankness and in return was speaking with equal frankness to them.

H.E. DR. FAWZI MULKI said that he hoped that the Arabs had clearly expressed their hostility to partition.

MR. BEVIN said that he was quite clear about the Arab point of view.

The Conference then adjourned.

St. James's Palace,
S.W.1.

4th February, 1947.

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[illegible] 7/2

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

Cypher (O.T.P.)

E 1121/2/31

TO PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham) 6 FEB 1947

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 5th February, 1947. 23.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
No. 244 Secret.

[illegible]

Palestine Conference.

Tenth plenary meeting with the Arab Delegations was held on 4th February. Faris Bey Khouri opened the session by reading a long statement representing the agreed views of the Arab Delegations. This statement reaffirmed their view that the Arabs were the lawful owners of Palestine and had never acknowledged the validity of the Balfour Declaration. They did not feel themselves responsible for Nazi persecution of Jews nor did they agree that Palestine should be regarded as the only place where Jewish refugees could be received. Faris Bey quoted the resolution of the United Nations setting up the International Refugee Organisation, where it was urged that the Organisation should give due weight to any evidence of genuine apprehension and concern regarding the influx of refugees felt by indigenous populations of receiving countries, particularly non-self-governing countries. They rejected any proposal for a Zionist state or bridgehead in Palestine or any part of it, and insisted on the termination of Jewish immigration. They still regarded the plan put forward by them in September as the most just and practicable possible. If Great Britain took the case to the United Nations, a course which the Arab Delegations did not admit to be necessary, then they would not feel themselves bound by the proposals they had put forward but would hold themselves free to present their case ab initio.

2. Other Arab Delegates expressed their support for Faris Bey's statement. Hakki Bey asked if the motive of those supporting Jewish immigration into Palestine was to increase the Jewish population until they became a

/majority

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majority, or whether it was purely humanitarian with the object of relieving the distress of displaced persons. If the former, it was a political object to which the Arabs would never agree; if the latter, the question was one for the International Refugee Organisation. After discussion on the history of the Mandate, the validity of the White Paper, and the possibility of accepting socially and economically further influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, the debate turned to the beneficial effects on Arab economy of the establishment of the National Home. I asked the Arab Delegates to recognise that as a result of the influx of Jewish capital the whole economic outlook of Palestine had changed, with the result that communications had been developed, marshes had been drained, and the field of employment for Arabs had been extended and their standard of living raised. Palestinian representatives disputed this contention, saying that Jewish colonies in Palestine were pauper institutions in debt to the extent of £15 million. They claimed that the two biggest marshes had been drained by the Supreme Moslem Council and the Huleh area had been reclaimed by the government with public money and given to the Jews. They also maintained that Jewish industry was in an unsound financial position and that few Jewish undertakings in Palestine could survive on their own resources in a free economy. Dr. Khalil said that it was important to bear in mind how deeply the younger generations of Arabs in Palestine felt about this problem. He said that opposition to partition would be much stronger than in the disturbances of 1937, and in answer to a question by the Foreign Secretary, claimed that Palestinian Arabs were prepared for war.

3. The Foreign Secretary said that it had been suggested to him that opposition to partition was possibly not as unrelenting as had been indicated by the Arab Delegations. Dr. Jamali recalled the resolution of the Arab League Council which affirmed the unanimous support of the States' members of the League for resistance to partition.

/4.

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4. Faris Bey Khouri said that if the British Government could concede two points only, then he still saw hope of an agreed solution. He asked the British Delegation to state that they would not in any circumstances contemplate the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, or in any part of Palestine, and that Jewish immigration would now cease. The Foreign Secretary replied that even if he were to say that His Majesty's Government would not contemplate the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine he was still faced by the immigration problem. Public opinion in the United Kingdom believed that further Jewish immigration should take place. He approached the Conference table with the knowledge that some of the principal members of the Cabinet had already reached a definite conclusion on what solution should be adopted in Palestine. He wished to be able to tell his colleagues all the implications of any step which might be taken. Dr. Khalil had said that if partition were imposed it would mean war in Palestine. He could not contemplate war. The stage had been reached where after hearing what the Arabs and Jews had to say he would have to put before his colleagues a suggestion for a solution which most reasonable people would think possible and acceptable. If he could devise no such solution then His Majesty's Government must go to the United Nations, and either hand over the problem to them or seek their authority for a change in the provisions of the Mandate. He was determined to evolve a proposal for a solution which would commend itself to all reasonable people. He could say no more at this meeting as he must first consult his Government. The British had a clear conscience over Palestine. He felt there was still a chance for a solution.

5. The Conference then adjourned.

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" "	- Mr. C.W. Baxter.
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M.I.5.	- Mr. A.J. Kellar.
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" "	- M.I.3A.
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END
19 FEB. 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

P.C.(A)(P) 10th Meeting

COPY NO. 71

PALESTINE CONFERENCE, 1946-47

UNITED KINGDOM - ARAB DELEGATIONS

Notes of Tenth meeting held at 1, Carlton Gardens, London, S.W.1., on Tuesday, 4th February, 1947, at 3.0 p.m.

CORRIGENDA

AMENDMENTS BY PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION

Page 25, Line 14

After:- "buy it back"

Insert:- "or rent it"

Page 25, Line 16

Delete:- "Arabs"

Insert:- "Moslems"

Page 26, Line 15

Delete:- "Iraq"

Insert:- "Arabs"

Page 26, Line 25

After:- "employed"

Insert:- "and Government raised customs barriers to assist Zionist industry"

Page 31, Lines 15 and 16

Amend these lines to read:-

"Dr. Omar Khalil endorsed the views expressed by Jamal Bey Husseini - he suggested that, ..."

No other amendments to the above minutes having been received, it is requested that the copies of the Draft Minutes in your possession should be regarded as FINAL copies.

St. James's Palace, S.W.1.

17TH FEBRUARY, 1947.

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